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Scholarship addressed to the good faith provisions' of the Uniform
Commercial Code primarily discusses the intractable difficulty of defining the scope of the obligation to perform and enforce one's contract in
good faith.2 Many scholars advocate an expansive interpretation of
good faith, currently defined in the Code as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned. ' 3 One writer proposes that good
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1. The good faith obligation discussed in this article is set forth in section 1-203 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-203. "Good faith" is defined in UCC
section 1-201(19) to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." Article 2,
however, contains a separate definition of good faith to be employed when that Article expressly
imposes a good faith requirement. Section 2-103(l)(b) provides: "'Good faith' in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). See note 34 infra.
2. The most comprehensive study is Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and
the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968), in which the
author recognizes the difficulty of providing specific content to the Code provision and advocates
its use to exclude certain conduct from acceptable commercial behavior. Summers discusses potential remedies for bad faith conduct, but does not discuss the feasibility or internal consistency
of such remedies. Id 252-62. Other treatments of the good faith obligation are found in Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and CommercialReasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963), and Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CuRRENT LEGAL
PROB. 16 (1956). Application of the obligation to specific problems is discussed in Dugan, Good
Faith and the Enforceability of StandardizedTerms, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1980); Hillman,
Policing ContractModifications Under the UC. C: Good Faithand the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IowA L. REv. 849 (1979); Holmes,A Contextual Study of CommercialGood Faith: GoodFaith Disclosurein ContractFormation, 39 U. Pri. L. REv.381 (1978).
3. U.C.C. § 1-201(19). See note Isupra.
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faith be defined to require commercial actors to forbear from declaring
technical breaches.4 Another proposes that good faith requires disclosure of advantageous information withheld to attain a superior bargain
rather than to deceive or cheat.5 At least one court has adopted an
expansive interpretation of good faith to prevent commercial actors
from taking advantage of changed circumstances that adversely affect
other contracting parties.6 Another court has been asked to rule that a
seller's denial of a buyer's request for modification of a contract constitutes bad faith conduct. 7 In these instances the obligation becomes less
of a duty not to create undue risks to others and more of a duty to assist
others confronted with risks not created by the obligor.
An expansive good faith obligation is appealing. It suggests that
commercial law be guided by ethical considerations such as promisekeeping, benevolence, and equality of interested parties in addition to
traditional prohibitions of fraud or deceit. Moreover, the phrase "good
faith" connotes altruism and creative remedies against selfishness or
egotism.8 Nevertheless, this article questions the propriety of an expansive interpretation of the good faith obligation. The article concludes
that, notwithstanding a drafting history that partially supports the use
of a good faith obligation to transform altruistic behavior into a legal
duty, and subsequent scholarly development of that interpretation,
courts justifiably have restricted the scope of the obligation. This conclusion is predicated on arguments that an expansive obligation extends the responsibilities of commercial actors beyond bargained-for
risk allocations, subjects bargains to inconsistent and uncertain enforcement, and does not produce offsetting benefits in commercial conduct.
Implicit in these conclusions is the belief that the nebulous scope
of good faith may be clarified by focusing on the availability of an
appropriate remedy within each proffered definition. To define an obligation in terms of the remedies available for its violation may appear
to go about the rights-remedies process backwards. Once a right is determined to exist, one may argue, judicial latitude must be permitted in
4. See Summers, supra note 2, at 234-35.
5. See fHolmes, supra note 2, at 435-49. Lord Mansfield imposed an obligation of good faith
that required disclosure of unusual facts known to only one contracting party. See P. ATIYAH,
THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 168-69 (1979).
6. Baker v. Ratzlaff, I Kan. App. 2d 285, 288, 564 P.2d 153, 156 (1977).
7. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 865 (1979).
8. See Kennedy, Fonn and Substance in PrivateLaw Adudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685

(1976).
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order to structure a remedy appropriate to the situation.9 The Code,
however, is a tool for businessmen and their attorneys to predict the
legal consequences of voluntary transactions.' 0 Realization of that goal
requires precision of definition and certainty of the effects of performance and nonperformance. Perhaps predictability sometimes can be
achieved by relatively vague standards." Nevertheless, vagueness of
the good faith language raises suspicions about the scope and force of
the obligation. Investigation into potential remedies may reveal
whether the consequences of violating the good faith obligation are sufficiently clear to state that the obligation provides the predictability
promised by the Code.
The existence of a certain remedy for a violation of a statutory
obligation of good faith takes on additional significance in light of Professor Powell's observation that the success of such a provision depends
on its independent force. 12 He explains the degree of vitality of similar
provisions in European legal systems as a function of the remedies provided for their violation. 13 Responding nearly a decade ago to Powell's
work, Professors Kessler and Gilmore were uncertain whether the good
faith obligation would become a substantial, enforceable requirement
of commercial behavior or little more than statutory surplusage. 14 The
conclusions of this article suggest that, thus far, courts largely have resisted the entreaties of commentators to invigorate the good faith obligation. The question is whether that outcome is desirable or
inevitable. 15
I.

THE "ORIGINAL INTENT"

Measurement of the proper scope of the good faith obligation requires understanding its intended function in ordering commercial behavior. The decision to define "good faith" in the Code to include only
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned" is not decisive of the drafters' intent. "Honesty" may be interpreted to preclude
9. Summers, for instance, contends that "case law reform" is necessary to provide remedies
for bad faith if tort or contract remedies fail to address the actor's conduct. Summers, supra note
2, at 252-53.
10. See U.C.C. § 1-102; W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 304

(1973).
11. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1704-05.
12. See Powell, supra note 2, at 31.
13. See id 32-35.
14. See F. KESSLER & G. GiLMORE, CONTRACTS 912 (1970).

15. Reaching some consensus on the scope of the Code obligation of good faith gains importance in light of the inclusion of a similar good faith obligation in the most recent tentative draft of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (rent. Draft No. 8, 1973). That section adds to

the obligation a requirement of "fair dealing."
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only active misrepresentations or, more broadly, to prohibit obligors
from taking unfair advantage of an obligee's weak position, although
the obligor bears no responsibility for the creation of that position. In
the absence of a clear concept of "honesty," one can envision a number
of functions of the good faith obligation that the drafters of the Code
might have contemplated. Possible functions include: to impose liability only for lying, deceit, or fraud; 16 to create a gap filler that permits
judges to impose liability for condemnable commercial behavior that
does not fit within traditional categories of actionable conduct;' 7 to impose liability on commercial actors who fail to satisfy their voluntarily
assumed obligations, consistent with the ethical imperative to keep
one's promise (even if that requires personal sacrifice);' 8 and to encourage commercial actors to behave in the most reasonable manner
under the circumstances, considering the interests of other parties.' 9
Each objective proscribes a different range of conduct and requires
a different sanction. The first objective, for instance, condemns dishonesty only in its most restricted sense, while the fourth objective condemns numerous forms of commercial conduct that cannot be reached
by even a broad definition of dishonesty, such as negligent failure to
disclose information or admitted-and therefore "honest"-attempts to
take advantage of other parties. Each interpretation assumes a model
of proper commercial behavior and purports to penalize noncompliance with that model. Inability to remedy a violation of the obligation
in a manner consistent with the rest of the Code and amenable to our
notion of commercial remedies would go far to undermine any of these
objectives. Furthermore, if we are unable to determine the intended
interpretation of the good faith obligation and if we also assume that
the drafters did not intend to enact an internally inconsistent scheme of
commercial law, the unavailability of a remedy necessary to accom16. This interpretation follows from a literal reading of section 1-201(19). See Summers,
supra note 2, at 213-15.

17. This gap-filler function appears to be that intended by the UCC's good faith obligation as
discussed in Danzig, A Comment on the Jurrprudenceofthe Uniform CommercialCode, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 621, 631 (1975). It is also consistent with the "excluder" analysis in Summers, supra note

2. Farnsworth perceives the function of good faith as permitting judges "[to imply] terms in the
agreement." Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 670.
18. On the relationship between commercial law and the sanctity of promises, see C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Cohen, The .Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 571-75

(1933).
19. Of course, these concepts are not mutually exclusive. For example, Summers includes
the gap-filler function in a family of doctrines that "supplement, limit and qualify specific legal
rules." Summers, supra note 2, at 198. The supplementation process, however, takes place against
a moral background that Summers implies is inherent in proper commercial conduct. See id 198,
214.
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plish any of these objectives would help us determine which objective
actually was intended.
The drafting history of the Code does not indicate conclusively
which interpretation of the good faith provision was intended. At an
early stage of the process, the drafters defined the obligation of good
faith to include both honesty in fact and observance of reasonable commercial standards in an actor's business or trade.20 The Comment to
section 1-203 explained the obligation in terms of "commercial decencies" and envisioned commercial practice as a cooperative, rather than
an adversarial, process.2 ' The Comment implied that a contract creates
a relationship that requires each party to act with due regard for the
interests of both parties. If this Comment had survived, an expansive
interpretation of the obligation could be defended on the ground that
among the "decencies" observed by parties to a contract is the recognition of affirmative duties towards one another that would not otherwise
exist. 22 The good faith obligation thus appeared to impose duties that

transcend the responsibilities of all persons not to lie or cheat. The
latter conduct was and is addressed by separate Code sections and requires no novel obligation to vindicate the rights of the defrauded and
cheated. "Commercial decencies" appear to exact an additional and
extraordinary degree of concern for others. Subsequently, however, the
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American
Bar Association advocated limiting the definition of good faith to the
absence of dishonesty, trickery, deceit, or improper purpose.2 3 The
ABA Section's Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code explained its proposal as a means of avoiding inflexibility in commercial
20. Section 1-201(16) of the May 1949 Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code defined good
faith as follows: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.
Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged." U.C.C. § 1-201(16)
(May 1949 Draft). The drafting history is considered in some depth in Summers, supra note 2.
The discussion here is an attempt to build on and point out differences with Summers's interpretation.
21. Perhaps the most significant sentence in the Comment to section 1-203 was: "This Act
adopts the principles of those cases which see a commercial contract not as an 'arm's-length'
adversary venture, but as a venture of material interest, when successful, and as involving due
regard for commercial decencies when the expected favorable outcome fails." U.C.C. § 1-203,
Comment (May 1949 Draft).
22. The obvious analogue is to the principle in tort law that, notwithstanding the absence of a
general duty to save another person from harm not caused by the actor, that actor is obligated to
attempt a rescue if there is a special relationship between the parties, including certain familial
and business relationships. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 340-43 (4th ed.

1971).
23. ABA

SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE COM-

MITrEE ON THE PROPOSED COMMERCIAL CODE, reprintedin Malcolm,

Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 128 (1951).

The ProposedCommercial
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customs by ensuring that practices existing at a given moment did not
become a perpetual standard. 24 It appears, however, that the Committee was responding with equal fervor to those members of the bar who
considered section 1-203 an affront to the good name of commercial
interests. 25 In response, the 1952 version of the Code limited the
defini'26
tion of "good faith" to its present form of "honesty in fact."
A less altruistic motivation for limiting the obligation is suggested
by Grant Gilmore's account of the drafting history of the Code.27 Gilmore indicates that practicing attorneys who participated in drafting
the Code became more influential as the document reached its final
stages. 28 The practitioners allegedly used their influence to restrict opportunities for courts to create innovative commercial obligations. The
Code, instead, was to employ language that would "control the courts
and compel decision." 29 This version of the drafting process suggests
that the limitation in the current definition of good faith 3° was intentional-a clear rejection of "commercial decencies" as an unnecessarily
broad, moralistic imperative. Instead, only the deliberate lie, the malicious deception, was outlawed. The Comment incorporating "commercial decencies" was replaced with a vague paraphrase of the language
of section 1-203. 3 1 If the drafters intended to emasculate the obligation,
Summers's contention that "[i]f an obligation of good faith is to do its
job, it must be open-ended" 32 misses the mark. The final version of the
Comment deliberately defines the job of good faith in a closed-ended
manner. Only in the-Article 2 sections that specifically refer to good
faith, thereby incorporating the section 2-103(1)(b) definition, 33 is there
24. Id, reprintedin 6 Bus. LAW. 128 (1951). The Report concluded that if its recommendations were adopted, "[s]ection 1-203 might be eliminated as unnecessary." Id, reprintedin 6 Bus.
LAW. 128 (1951).
25. See id, reprintedin6 Bus. LAW. 128 (1951). Malcolm reported that members of the ABA

Section adopted on May 16, 1950, a resolution that noted objections "to the point of view appearing or reflected in some sections, and more frequently in the Comments, to the effect that business
interests are rapacious and that it is necessary to protect other members of the public from oppression from such interests." Malcolm, The ProposedCommercialCode, 6 Bus. LAW. 113, 115 (1951).
26. See U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (Official Draft 1952).
27. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 83-86 (1977).
28. Id. 85.
29. Id.
30. See note I supra.
31. In the 1952 Official Draft of the Code, language of "commercial decencies" had been

eliminated from the Comment to section 1-203. Instead, the Comment assumed its present form,
which provides few standards for defining good faith and confuses the issue by citing to Article 2
situations which presumably would be governed by the broader section 2-103(1)(b) definition of
good faith. See U.C.C. § 1-203, Comment (Official Draft 1952).
32. Summers, supra note 2, at 215.
33. See note I supra.
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a broader obligation for merchants to comply with34reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing as well as honesty.
While there may be equivocal support in the drafting history for a
literal and narrow reading of the "honesty in fact" definition of good
faith, the inquiry must not end there. Even after acceptance of the
unembellished "honesty in fact" definition, the Code's drafters and
sponsors did not define the phrase with unanimity. Professor Edwin
Patterson explained the function of section 1-203 to the New York Law
Revision Commission in terms more consistent with the "gap filler"
objective 35 than with the narrow literal wording of the provision. 36 To
him, the provision transcended the proscription of dishonesty and included requirements of "generosity," "co-operation," and mitigation of
the results of "hard luck." 37 The alteration of the Comment to section
1-203 did not change Professor Patterson's understanding of the provision's function. In a brief review of the legislative history of the
Code,38 then-Professor Braucher recalled that the extension of the good
faith obligation to enforcement as well as performance of the contract
was motivated by a desire to protect a defaulting buyer against a seller
who fails to mitigate damages. 39 Because failure to mitigate is only a
failure to assist, rather than dishonesty or deceit, it is difficult to reconcile Braucher's recollection with a narrow construction of "honesty in
fact." Students of the philosophy underlying the Code also seem to
favor a less restrictive interpretation of the good faith obligation as
most consistent with Code jurisprudence. 40 At times, this expansive interpretation is recognized explicitly, but often it is implicit in the perceived role of the good faith obligation. For instance, in a recent article
on the common law obligation of good faith, 41 Professor Burton argues
that a commercial actor exhibits bad faith when he'acts to recapture
opportunities forgone at earlier stages of the contracting process. On
34. There may be some argument that the broader definition of section 2-103(1)(b) pervades
all of Article 2. See Summers, supra note 2, at 212. Most commentators have concluded, however, that the definition applies only to those sections of Article 2 that expressly mention good
faith. See id 212-13. Dugan, supra note 2, at 11-12.

35. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
36. 1 REPORT OF THE NEw YORK LAW REvIsION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 310-315 (1955).
37. Id 311. With this view, Professor Patterson suggested that the provision function as a
tabula in naufragio, a position supported by preexisting New York case law.
38. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv.

798 (1958).
39. Id 813.
40. See Danzig,supra note 17, at 634; Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 305.
41. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94

HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980).
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the assumption that such action necessarily harms the other party, 42
Burton's analysis requires a commercial actor to abstain from avoiding
the consequences of changed circumstances not only when he has assumed the risk of such changes, but also when he should have assumed
that risk. 43 Implicit in this rationale is the notion that good faith requires diligent concern for the other party's position, notwithstanding
an absence in the contract of an allocation of the risks that create that
concern.
Even if the drafters had concurred in an interpretation of good
faith, we would not be very far along the road to discovering its "intended" interpretation. The drafters did not adopt the Code; legislatures did, and we have virtually no evidence of what the legislatures
thought of the obligation. 44 Even if some drafters believed "honesty in
fact" included affirmative obligations to render aid, legislators easily
might have thought otherwise. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the understanding among the legislators of any one legislature was internally consistent or consistent with the understanding of
the legislature of another jurisdiction.

II.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE

Given the equivocal historical foundation for interpretation of the
good faith obligation as a means to transform commercial altruism into
a legal duty, it is useful to inquire how the courts have responded to the
provision. If courts have applied the obligation expansively, analysis of
the cases should test the assumption that an informal standard is susceptible to certainty of definition and consequence. Though less can be
concluded from a determination that the courts have avoided expansive
interpretations, this avoidance may suggest either judicial unwillingness or inability to develop the boundaries of "commercial decencies."
Perusal of the cases initially suggests judicial rejection of the literal
restriction of honesty in fact.45 A closer reading, however, reveals that
although conduct inconsistent with good faith has been discovered in
42. Id 387
43. See 1/390-91 (the identity of foregone opportunities is based on an objective standard).

44. Various state statutes contain commentary and annotations on Uniform Commercial
Code provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 1-101 to 10-105. (McKinney 1964). These annotations,
however, have been prepared by practitioners or academics in the state and do not appear to have
evolved from any legislative report. For background on the traditional difficulties of discerning
legislative motivation, see generally Symposium on LegislativeMotivation, 15 SAN DiEGo L. REV.
925 (1978).
45. See, e.g., Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 827-28 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied,441 U.S. 923 (1979) (good faith requires the buyer to notify the seller of a
continuing breach; no allegation of deceit or fraud).
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circumstances that might be considered void of dishonesty in the narrow sense, the legal consequences of that discovery are limited. Little

evidence exists that suggests the courts have invested the obligation
with a life of its own by permitting independent redress against bad

faith conduct. Remedies in cases that cite the good faith obligation
rarely seem directed at violation of that obligation.46 If bad faith were
an independent basis of legal liability, courts should find a breach of

contract in circumstances that, but for bad faith, would not justify the
finding of a breach. Alternatively, a more liberal damage award to the

victim of a bad faith breach might be observed. The cases in which
conduct violative of section 1-203 is discovered simply grant redress

that would have been available in the same fact situation notwithstanding the absence of a good faith obligation. 47
46. In Oloffson v. Coomer, I1 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973), the court held that a
dealer could not claim that his failure to cover a contract after an anticipatory repudiation was
permissible under the "commercially reasonable time" doctrine of section 2-6 10. Id at 922, 296
N.E.2d at 874. The court found that the dealer had unequivocal notice of nonperformance and
that his failure to disclose a usage of trade concerning contract cancellation constituted bad faith.
Id at 922-23, 296 N.E.2d at 874-75. It is unclear whether the bad faith argument constituted an
independent source of liability, see Liebson, Anticoatory Repudiation and Buyer's Damages-A
Look into How the UCCHas Changedthe Common Law, 7 U.C.C.L.L 272, 279 (1975), or was part
of the rationale for finding passage of a reasonable time, see Note, Failureto Cover and Time to
MeasureBuyer's Damages, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 233, 243 (1978). But see Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan.
App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977).
47. Indeed, one court, apprised of the possibility of creating an independent cause of action
for bad faith conduct, expressly refused to do so. In Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1976), plaintiff brought an action for damages suffered because of the disintegration of a
mobile home purchased from the defendants. In addition to claims based on misrepresentation
and implied warranty, plaintiff alleged a breach of a duty on the part of the defendants to exercise
good faith in their dealings with her. Though the appeals court remanded the case for trial on the
fraud and warranty allegations, it held that a claimed breach of the obligation imposed by section
1-203 did not state a claim for which relief could be granted. The court concluded with the admonition that nothing in the Code indicated the good faith requirement "was intended to be remedial
rather than directive." Id at 821.
It seems clear that the Chandler court believed that section 1-203 applied to the situation
before it, even though it did not believe that the provision permitted any remedial assistance to a
victim of bad faith; but there is some question of whether the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty
of good faith at all. The alleged breach of the obligation comprised representations that appear to
have been made in the course of negotiations with the purchaser, i.e., during the pre-contract
stage. Section 1-203, on which plaintiff relied, imposes an obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of a contract. The obligation to negotiate in good faith is conspicuously
absent. It does not appear that this omission is the result of oversight. In his analysis for the New
York State Law Revision Commission, Professor Patterson noted:
Good faith in the making of a commercial contract is not required by Section 1-203
and is not required by New York case law. That is, one party to such a contract is not
required to disclose to the other a material fact relating to the prudence or value of the
bargain, even though the one who knows this fact also is aware that the other party does
not know it, and would not make the contract if he did.
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 315. See also Cargill,
Inc. v. Kavanaugh, 228 N.W.2d 133, 140 (N.D. 1975). As Professor Summers has pointed out,
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In one series of cases, courts have used the good faith clause to
prevent obligors from altering situations that they lulled obligees into
believing would remain constant. In such cases, the affirmative conduct of the obligor may not rise to the level of an actionable misrepresentation, but it appears to reflect an effort to stay within the letter of
the contract while avoiding its spirit. Thus, an insurance company that
had waived its right under its policy to subrogation against an insured
could not revive the subrogation right by making a claim under an assignment.48 Similarly, a corporation whose principals also were partners in a partnership that had entered into a negative pledge agreement
with the government was not entitled to priority over the government
in assets subject to the negative pledge, although the corporation had
perfected its interest first. 49 These cases are similar to misrepresentation or dishonesty cases, however, in that the obligor's conduct is responsible for the weakened position of the obligee. These cases are
unlike situations in which obligors fail to assist or take advantage of a
weakened party whose position is not attributable to the obligor's conduct.
Outside of these few cases in which good faith has been used to
prohibit obligors from affirmatively altering circumstances that they induced obligees to believe would remain constant, the good faith obligation appears to play only a supporting role. In the typical case in which
section 1-203 is invoked, the court imposes liability on a bad faith actor
on the basis of some alternate substantive cause of action that appears
to form the primary ratiodecidendi of the court's holding. The absence
of good faith is relegated to little more than a makeweight to support
the alternative cause of action, and often appears, by its superficial
treatment, to be an afterthought.
In re Davidoffs° is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner bank
sought to reclaim dental equipment in which it had been granted a security interest prior to the debtor's bankruptcy. The bank had filed a
financing statement with the county clerk's office but had failed to
make the duplicate filing with the Secretary of State necessary to perfect a security interest in New York. Subsequently, the debtor borhowever, if good faith is limited to the requirement of honesty in fact, then the result of requiring
good faith negotiation also can be achieved through invocation of general principles of fraud and
deceit under section 1-103. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explicitly rejects application of the good faith obligation to the pre-contract stage. Instead, the Restatement leaves negotiators to their own devices and the common law remedy for fraud. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973).
48. Integrity Ins. Co. v. Davis, 116 NJ. Super. 417, 282 A.2d 452 (1971).
49. Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1969).

50. 351 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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termined shortly after taking possession that the engine was not performing as warranted by the seller and manufacturer. Nevertheless,
the purchaser delayed notifying the seller of the nonconformity and
thereafter refused to let him make repairs. Six months after he ceased
using the engine, the purchaser returned the engine and demanded rescission. The court denied the purchaser's claim on the theory that the
delay in informing the seller of his intended revocation was inconsistent with the good faith obligation. In these circumstances, however,
numerous explicit provisions of the Code could have been applied. Delay in the initial notification of breach can be used as grounds to bar
the purchaser from any remedy, including revocation;5 6 delay in notifying the seller of a revocation can preclude the right to revoke;57 and the
refusal to permit repair, even though goods have been accepted rather
than rejected, may be grounds for denying a subsequent revocation of
the acceptance. 58 The court's use of section 1-203 did not grant the
seller any rights that he did not already possess under other provisions.
Use of good faith as a shorthand indication of a party's rights under
more specific provisions does not indicate that the obligation possesses
"its own distinctive potential. . . as an independent theory of liability."5 9 Given these provisions the court could have and should have
reached the same decision whether delay in notification was predicated
on forgetfulness, an ignorant hope that the defect would go away, a
desire to avoid an embarrassing scene with the seller, or mendacity.
Indeed, use of an open-ended good faith obligation instead of the more
specific applicable Code provision indicates lack of precision in the
court's reasoning and detracts from the judicial development and comprehension of the Code. The case suggests that even when violation of
the good faith obligation is announced, the violation may carry no in60
dependent legal consequences.
It might be argued that these cases do not demonstrate conclusively the absence of remedies for violation of the good faith obligation,
but only that multiple recovery will not be permitted when an actor
violates more than one legal rule in performing a single activity. If the
manufacturer of a defective product is sued in negligence, breach of
56. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a).
57. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).,
58. Section 2-508 refers only to the seller's ability to cure after rejection. Nevertheless, an
argument may be made that under section 2-608(3) an aggrieved buyer has the duty to permit cure
even after he revokes, at least if revocation is not predicated on previous failures to cure that
suggest additional efforts would be futile. See U.C.C. § 2-608(l)(a).
59. Summers, supra note 2, at 199.
60. For cases in which section 1-203 receives similar treatment, see Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (section 1-203 used to augment section 2-719).
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rowed additional funds from a dental supply company and granted a
security interest to the company in the same collateral previously assigned to the bank. The debtor, however, informed the company that
the collateral previously had been assigned to the bank. The court rejected the argument of the second secured creditor's assignee that it was
entitled to priority because of the bank's failure to file in all required
locations. The court noted that had the second secured creditor seen
the properly filed financing statement at the county clerk's office, it
would have had sufficient knowledge to disable it under section 9401(2) from claiming priority because of the unfiled financing statement. The court reasoned that oral notification to the second secured
creditor placed that creditor in the same position as if it had seen the
financing statement in the county clerk's office. 51 Thus, the creditor's
knowledge disabled it from claiming priority over the preexisting interest. The court then noted that by including the phrase "or duty" in
section 1-203, the drafters of the UCC intended to impose an obligation
of good faith towards third parties as well as parties to a contract, and
concluded: "Under the circumstances of this case, it was not good faith
the debtor had already
to impose a security interest on assets which
' 52
said were secured to [the petitioner bank]."
The good faith discussion is superfluous in these circumstances.
53
The conclusion of the court, apparently supported by New York law,
was based on the element of notice. The subsequent invocation of good
faith adds nothing: no additional damages are assessed, no further priority is lost, and no additional property is gained by the estate. 54 The
identical result could be attained solely by citation to section 9-401(2).
Inclusion of the good faith discussion merely embellishes the true reason for the holding.
In some cases, courts do write as though violation of the good faith
obligation is the primary basis of liability. Closer inspection of the
facts of the cases, however, indicates that use of the good faith provision does not reflect an independent obligation. Rather, in these cases
good faith language is used as a surrogate for other causes of action not
explicitly mentioned in the court's opinion.
In a recent case, 55 for instance, a purchaser of a fishing vessel de51. Id at443.
52. Id at 444.
53. See id
54. Similar use of the good faith obligation is found in Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v.
Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 US. 923 (1979); T & W Ice

Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 NJ. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969).
55. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Olympic Foundry Co., 17 Wash. App. 761, 565 P.2d 819
(1977).
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warranty, and strict liability, the successful plaintiff recovers only once,

not three times. Similarly, the victim of a contractual breach is entitled
to recovery on the breach and nothing more. There are several responses to this argument. First, the courts never explain the absence of
a good faith award in this manner. Of course, little should be inferred
from silence, but it is unnerving to find no case in which the court says,
for example, "Having disposed of the case on the issue of X, we need
not address the further claim that defendant violated his obligation to
perform his contract in good faith." Second, if an independent remedy
is available only when no alternative basis of liability exists, then good
faith is dispositive in a very small percentage of cases and perhaps the
definition should be restricted to fit only those cases. Third, if the good
faith obligation were properly the subject of an independent cause of
action, remedy for its breach would not necessarily be the same as the
remedy for the other cause of action in the case, and thus one would
expect discussion of each theory of recovery and the appropriate remedy.
Finally, if the good faith obligation has independent vitality that
can be addressed by independent remedies, cases should exist in which
the obligation is so used. The case that comes closest to addressing
good faith as an independent obligation is W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford
Corp.,6 1 in which the court denied recovery on plaintiffs claim that a
franchisor had failed on termination of the franchise to repurchase inventory. The court intimated the possibility of a different result had
violation of the good faith obligation been pleaded and proved:
"[P]roof that the manner in which the repurchase election was exercised at the time of termination amounted to a breach of Philco's implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing would have been an
independent basis for a recovery of damages. ' 62 The court did not explain, however, how that theory, or the proof necessary to the theory,
differed from the theory based on contractual obligation that the court
had before it.
III.

THE

OBLIGATION AND

ITS REMEDY:

COMMERCIAL GOOD

FAITH AND COMMERCIAL GOOD SAMARITANISM

The suggestion that courts have done little to remedy violations of
an expansive concept of good faith may imply that courts both can and
should do more. As discussed below, there are several reasons why the
courts' parsimonious application of the good faith obligation is proper
61. 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
62. Id at 710, 543 P.2d at 288.
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and why arguments for an expansive good faith obligation should be
rejected.6 3 Where good faith prohibits limited notions of dishonesty,
the costs of interpretation, administration, and remedy are recognized
as worth the resulting benefits. This section suggests that those costs
increase in number and intensity the further one proceeds from a narrow interpretation of honesty in fact. They may multiply to an unacceptable level if good faith is used to police the substantive fairness of a
transaction or to convert commercial actors into brothers' keepers.
No attempt is made in this section to define the point at which a
definition of good faith becomes "too" expansive. It is argued, however, that the requirement some commentators advocate that one party
to a contract must aid another who has fallen into difficulty through no
fault of the first party-a situation that will be referred to as "commercial good samaritanism"-falls outside the proper boundaries of the
good faith obligation. Expansive notions of good faith share a concept
of commercial behavior that embodies altruism or benevolence as well
as financial rewards. Altruism may be attainable and may actually reflect common commercial conduct. Professor Macaulay's study64 evidences the development of an interdependence among commercial
actors that minimizes disputes and facilitates resolution of those disputes that do occur. Nevertheless, to the extent that commercial actors
choose not to act selflessly, the good faith provisions of the Code
should not be used to impose an affirmative duty to aid.
To clarify the issue, this article proposes three situations which,
intuitively at least, cry out for judicially compelled altruism. If, on reflection, we would reject application of the good faith provision to provide an independent remedy in these circumstances, we may more
readily restrict the meaning of good faith in less compelling situations.
The following analysis, therefore, is made in light of these paradigm
situations:
Paradigm 1. A buyer of goods openly seizes on a trivial defect,
e.g., a tender one day late where the delinquency does not affect materially the buyer's ability to use the goods, in order to reject under a
perfect tender rule because the market price of the goods has declined
from the contract price. 65
63. This section does not presume, however, that courts have consciously avoided an expansive interpretation of good faith for the reasons stated herein.
64. Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 55 (1963); see Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dymrics of Coercive Collection, 80
YALE LJ. 1, 24-26 (1970).
65. Summers considered this conduct a concrete example of bad faith. See Summers, supra

note 2, at 205-06. See also Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977). Professor
Honnold similarly suggested that the good faith obligation might be used to prevent the buyer
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Paradigm2. A secured creditor who has taken possession of collateral to perfect his security interest discovers information, equally

available to the pledgor-debtor but undiscovered by him, that threatens
the value of the collateral. The creditor takes no steps to bring the

information to the attention of the debtor. Similar situations have
arisen most frequently when an issuer of convertible debentures in

bearer form that have been pledged gives notice of redemption that
reaches the secured party and not the debtor, and the debentures then
lose their convertible feature. Assuming that the creditor was under no

duty to discover the notice of redemption and act on it to satisfy his
obligation to take reasonable care of the collateral, 66 and that he never-

theless obtains notice of the impending redemption, e.g., through a
newspaper advertisement equally available to the debtor, one could argue that the creditor has an obligation under the good faith provision
67
to notify the debtor and receive instructions.
Paradigm3. Shortly before his performance under a binding con-

tract is due, a seller of goods informs the buyer of his unwillingness to
from avoiding the contract in these circumstances. See Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U.
PA. L. Rav. 457, 475 (1949).
66. U.C.C. § 9-207(1). Compare Traverse v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
535 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1967) with Siedman v. Merchant's Bank of New York, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
881 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970) and Brodheim v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 75 Misc. 2d 285, 347 N.Y.S.2d
394 (1973).
67. It might appear inconsistent to state that one can act "reasonably" for purposes of section
9-207 without also acting in good faith under section 1-203. Reasonable conduct, however, may
include conduct that fails to avert a known danger to others.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 (1965) provides: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action." Illustrations of the rule make clear that one can disregard with impunity relatively costfree opportunities to rescue others under a rule of reasonableness:
Illustration:
I. A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching
automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without delaying his
own progress. A does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty to
prevent B from stepping into the street, and is not liable to B.
4. A, a strong swimmer, sees B, against whom he entertains an unreasonable hatred, floundering in deep water and obviously unable to swim. Knowing B's identity, he
turns away. A is not liable to B.
Id Illustrations 1, 4. If, notwithstanding the reasonableness of the creditor's conduct under these
traditional rules of nonfeasance, the good-faith obligation is interpreted expansively to require
decency and mutual assistance, the creditor in this paradigm can violate section 1-203 without
contravening section 9-207.
Nor is such a result illogical. A rule that makes persons liable for failure to avert known
dangers creates a disincentive to obtain knowledge that would be helpful for reasons other than
rescue of endangered parties. For instance, in the second paradigm a rule that knowledge triggers
a duty to rescue could induce lenders to keep certain officers or employees ignorant of financial
information which, if they had, they would voluntarily use to benefit borrowers. See Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure Information, andthe Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1978).
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perform unless the contract price is revised in his favor to reflect postcontract market conditions. The buyer pleads inability either to meet
the demand for a price increase or to obtain fungible goods elsewhere
on such short notice. Hence he is unwilling to declare an anticipatory
repudiation. Instead, the buyer relies on exhortation and pleas, but apparently to no avail. Notwithstanding the ostensible failure of the
buyer's pleas, the seller does perform for fear of the consequences of a
breach of contract action; his threats of nonperformance turn out to be
only a bluff to try to improve his previous bad bargain. The buyer,
had the
relieved but exhausted from the thought of the consequences
68
seller not performed, accepts the seller's performance.
There is a parallel in the issue presented by these cases to the tort
law question of whether one party can be held liable for refusal to take
relatively costless action to rescue another. The rescue duty in tort
arises in two ways: first, when the danger is created by the actor upon
69
whom the duty is imposed; and second, when a special relationship
70
exists between the person endangered and the potential rescuer. In
the commercial setting, judicial animosity toward imposing affirmative
duties to act has been set aside in situations analogous to the first circumstance described above. Thus, in the "lull" cases--in which the
obligor's bad faith conduct consists of affirmatively inducing the obligee into a vulnerable position and attempting to exploit the vulnerabil71
ity-the good faith obligation has been given substantive content. It
seems clear, however, that an expansive notion of good faith transcends
these few cases and imposes affirmative duties on obligors to !"rescue"
obligees whose expectations in a transaction have been adversely affected by circumstances not created by the obligor. If there is an analogy to tort liability, it is to those cases in which courts have found that a
special relationship exists between the rescuer and the rescuee that trig68. In this last paradigm, the injury suffered by the buyer is more ephemeral because the
seller has performed. Furthermore, any injury to the buyer results from the seller's affirmative
conduct in threatening not to perform. Thus the paradigm does not represent a true good-samaritan situation, where the potential actor is not responsible for the victim's predicament. Nevertheless, this paradigm demonstrates some of the impediments to an expansive interpretation of good
faith.
69. See note 22 supra.
70. See, eg., REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 322-323 (1965), which require an actor
who has placed another in danger to avoid materialization of the danger even if the actor, in
creating the risk, was not negligent or otherwise acting in a tortious manner. For some consequences of such provisions, see Gillette, Book Review, 60 B.U.L. Rav. 383, 392-96 (1980). See
note 68 supra.
71. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
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gers a duty to rescue.72 To uphold the analogy in the commercial area,
one must argue that the contract itself creates the special relationship.
Thus, we might construe good faith to oblige an actor not to realize for
himself potential advantages of the circumstances to the detriment of
the other. The commercial relationship thus triggers not merely duties
of performance, but also duties of mutual support and aid. It is in this
sense that section 1-203 was originally explained to accomplish "due
73
regard for commercial decencies."
In deciding whether a commercial relationship triggers duties of
mutual aid, we first examine the Code's provisions for good samaritanism aside from section 1-203. If other language in the Code embraces
opportunities for imposing obligations of mutual aid, it would be consistent to read section 1-203 similarly. The Code, however, is ambivalent toward requiring aid in specific situations, and this ambivalence
belies an intention to create a general duty of mutual assistance. The
Code embodies the common law requirement that an aggrieved party
mitigate damages caused by a breacher, both by explicit limitation of
damages to those that could not have been prevented 74 and, implicitly,
by calculating damages in a manner that encourages the aggrieved
party to secure alternative performance shortly after the breach. 75 The
mitigation requirement may represent a policy of commercial good
samaritanism in that it encourages nonbreachers to act with regard for
the interests of the defaulting party. Other Code provisions, however,
reject the notion of good samaritanism. One of the most blatant rejections is found in section 1-203 itself. Its failure to extend the good faith
obligation to the negotiation process7 6 apparently reflects a deliberate
choice to permit parties to refrain from disclosing material information
to others.77 Similarly, one might expect a good samaritan duty to trigger obligations not only toward other parties to a contract, but also to
third parties related to other contracting parties. 78 In light of this possibility, it seems anomalous with good samaritanism that the priority system of Article 9 comprises a pure race statute. It may be immaterial
72. See C. GREGORY, H.

KALVEN

& R. EPSTErI, CASES

AND MATERIALS ON TORTS

338-60

(3d ed. 1977).

73. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
74. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2).

75. See id § 2-713, Comment I.
76. Some commentators argue that the good faith obligation should extend to the negotiation
process. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 2; Summers, supra note 2, at 218.
77. See REPORT OF THE NEw YORK LAW REvisION COMMISSION, supra note 36, at 315
(comments of Professor Patterson).
78. Tort law recognizes that one's affirmative obligations to A may be created by one's special relationship with B. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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that the first party to perfect his security interest in assets of a debtor
had prior notice of a competing party's unperfected security interest. A
good samaritan duty would suggest forbearance from taking advantage
of a prior party's failure to perfect. 79
The Code's general ambivalence toward commercial good
samaritanism fails to clarify the intended scope of section 1-203. We
therefore must focus on the normative issue of whether section 1-203
should be used to achieve commercial good samaritanism. That inquiry would be facilitated if authorization exists to remedy bad faith
conduct and if courts can devise a meaningful remedy.
Some Code language supports a remedy for violation of the good
faith obligation, however good faith is defined. Section 1-102 directs
courts to construe the Code "to promote its underlying purposes and
policies." Though these purposes and policies are generally stated,80
they arguably include the specific obligation of good faith conduct,
which can be promoted most effectively by allowing redress for its
breach. Section 1-106(2) provides that any obligation declared by the
Code "is enforceable by action unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect." 8' Since section 1-203 imposes an
"obligation" and does not specify a "different or limited effect" for failure to comply, the Code appears to authorize an independent cause of
action to redress bad faith conduct. The term "obligation" in section 1203 itself suggests that the obligee has an enforceable right to the performance of the obligation. It is the ability to enforce that separates the
entreaty that one is "obligated" to perform an act from the entreaty
that one "ought" to do the act or that it would be expedient for one to
do the act.8 2 Unlike the other motives for acting, failure to fulfill an
"obligation" to act implies a violation of the right of the obligee for
which he may obtain a remedy.
79. As noted in the discussion of In re Davidoff, see text accompanying notes 50-54 supra, in
some situations a prior financing statement that has not been filed in all required locations is
effective against persons with knowledge of the contents of the financing statement. See U.C.C. §

9-401(2).
80. Section 1-102(2) provides:
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are

(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;

(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
U.C.C. § 1-102(2).

81. U.C.C. § 1-106(2).
82. See J. RAwI.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 112-14 (1971); Hart, Are T7here Any Natural
Rights?, 64 PsILosoPHIcAL REv. 175 (1955). But see R. NozicI, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA
91-92 (1974) (questioning Hart's analysis).
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Notwithstanding section 1-106(2), both the ability of courts to
fashion remedies for violation of the good faith obligation and the desirability of the attempt are questionable. Three facts support this assertion: no express authorization exists in the Code for imposing such a
remedy, despite the favorable language of Article 1; the ambiguity of
the good faith obligation causes any remedy for its violation to be administered arbitrarily and unevenly; and, any remedy for bad faith
conduct conflicts with and jeopardizes other goals of contract and commercial law without producing countervailing benefits.
A. Authorization to Impose a Remedy.
Any doubts concerning authorization appear to be foreclosed by
sections 1-102 and 1-106.83 Nevertheless, in numerous cases it is difficult to formulate specific remedies from these general enabling provisions. The variety of injuries suffered as a result of bad faith conduct
unrelated to a breach of contract does not fit easily within the Code's
remedial provisions. This section will demonstrate the existence of that
gap and argue that efforts to bridge it would undercut the accepted and
justifiable understanding of commercial responsibilities.
The remedy issue poses little difficulty in cases in which good faith
is an explicit prerequisite to attaining a certain legal relationship. For
instance, section 2-305 permits parties to conclude a contract for sale
notwithstanding an open price term. Subsection (2) of section 2-305
allows one of the parties to fix the price term after the conclusion of the
contract, but imposes the express requirement of "good faith."' 4 The
remedy for failure to fix the price in good faith is clear: the price term
is void and a new price may be supplied by the court.85 In effect, good
faith is a statutory condition precedent to attaining authority to set the
price.86 The remedy for failure to exercise good faith is to deny the
83. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
84. Section 2-305 provides in part:
Open Price Term
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the
price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery
if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set
or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in
good faith.
U.C.C. § 2-305.
85. See, eg., Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1979)
(dicta).
86. Similarly, a contractual condition is a fact or event necessary to produce a change in legal
relations. 3A A. CoaRn, CoN-RAcrs § 627, at 11-12 (1960).
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actor that authority.
Arguably, denial of a desired legal status can be used to remedy
bad faith conduct even if the good faith obligation is only implied by
section 1-203. Thus, although section 2-209, which governs modifications of contract, does not contain any .explicit good faith requirement,
courts have denied enforcement of modifications extracted in bad
faith.

7

Similarly, if in our second paradigm8 8 the secured creditor

were to discover himself under-collateralized once the conversion feature expired, we could deprive him of the right to demand additional
collateral if his inaction was attended by bad faith.
In some cases, however, the condition-precedent analogy does not
suffice. Where bad faith consists of nonperformance, le., breach or
cancellation as in our first paradigm,8 9 it is pointless to characterize
good faith as an unsatisfied condition. One might respond that so long
as damages for breach of contract are available, there is no reason for
additional remedies. This response, however, suggests that there is no
need for an independent remedy for bad faith conduct in any nonperformance case. As noted earlier, when courts speak of bad faith
breaches, they impose remedies based solely on the breach that are not
connected to the breacher's good or bad motives.
More important, the condition-precedent remedy is of no help in
cases like our third paradigm, 90 in which alleged bad faith conduct
does not affect the ultimate performance received by the obligee. 91 In
this situation, the victim of bad faith conduct does not want to avoid his
legal relationship with the obligor. Thus, denial of the relation does
not constitute an effective sanction nor does it vindicate the obligee's
interests. In such instances, an alternative remedy would give life to
the obligation to perform in good faith. In the second paradigm, for
instance, the debtor might seek to recover the difference in value of the
debentures before and after loss of the conversion privilege. 92 Alternative remedies, however, intensify the doctrinal difficulties of good faith.
87. See U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2; Hillman, supra note 2.

88. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 65 su~pra.
90. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
91. The third paradigm also is illustrated by deliberate delay in performance that does not
harm the promisee's fnancial position, or a purposeful or malicious faulty performance or nonperformance in which the promisor is willing to accept the consequences of his breach.
92. See cases cited in note 66 supra. In these cases the theory of recovery was the creditor's

failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to the collateral under section 9-207(1). Our paradigm assumes that the creditor has no such duty to discover the debenture redemption and the
issue centers on the creditor's responsibility should it learn of the redemption. See note 67 supra
for the argument that failure to disclose information that the creditor had no duty to discover does
not constitute unreasonable conduct.
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If the creditor was not acting unreasonably under section 9-207(1),93 no
negligence action can be brought against him for the devaluation of the

debentures. No clear statutory authorization exists for any action when
he fails to act after receiving actual notice. Authorization may be
found by interpreting section 1-106(2) as self-executing. But that interpretation merely raises the doctrinal uncertainty to another level. Sec-

tion 1-106(2) provides no guidance on how to measure damages outside
the general principle of section 1-106(1) that the debtor should be

placed in the same position he would have occupied had the creditor
acted in good faith. No standard determines at what time or place the

position of the aggrieved party is to be measured. Assuming fluctuation in the price of the debentures pending redemption, we do not
know whether good faith conduct would have led to sale at the highest
94
price, the lowest price, or the last available price.
The difficulty of reading section 1-106(2) to authorize a specific

remedy is even more evident with the third paradigm. Here the bar-

gained-for performance has occurred, albeit attended with unanticipated aggravation and dispute. A tort remedy for infliction of
emotional distress may be available, but such relief would not be de95
pendent on an obligation of good faith.

One obvious remedy for bad faith conduct would be an award of
punitive damages. The Code, however,, expressly rejects such an award

"except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law." 96
Oddly, neither section 1-203 nor any other section that imposes the

good faith obligation contains a "specific provision" for punitive damages within the meaning of section 1-106(1). Courts have thus denied
recovery of punitive damages where the act of the wrongdoer does not

97
rise to the level of fraud.

93. See note 67 supra.
94. Courts have differed on the appropriate method for assessing damages against a creditor
for failure to convert convertible securities in a timely manner. Compare Traverse v. Liberty
Bank & Trust Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 535, 542 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1967) (damages equal the
difference between the value of the collateral and its market value if properly converted on the
date that the plaintiffhad a right to possession) with Reed v. Central Nat'l Bank of Alva, 421 F.2d
113, 118 (10th Cir. 1970) (damages equal the difference in value prior to and after the failure to
convert, as of the final date for conversion).
95. It is not even clear that the buyer's conduct in this paradigm is sufficiently outrageous to
trigger the tort remedy. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 49-62 (4th ed.
1971).
96. U.C.C. § 1-106(1). The Code actually uses the phrase "penal damages," but courts uniformly have equated the phrase with punitive damages. See cases cited in note 97 infra.
97. See, eg., Fousel v. Ted Walker Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 Ariz. App. 126, 602 P.2d 507
(1979); Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 60 Ind. Dec. 221, 370 N.E.2d 918 (1977); Ford Motor
Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345
(Okla. 1975).
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One may fall back on the "other rule of law" criterion of section 1106(1) and combine that phrase with section 1-103 to find authorization
for such damages. Section 1-103 incorporates into the Code those
"principles of law and equity" not specifically displaced by particular
Code provisions.9" Two obstacles, however, prevent incorporation of
punitive damages for bad faith. First, the relevant preexisting principles of law and equity deny punitive damages in the absence of fraud.
Modem decisions have awarded punitive damages where a party to a
contract has engaged in tortious conduct, but the good faith question in
such cases is irrelevant or superfluous. 99 The punitive award flows

from the tortious behavior rather than from the absence of good faith.
Fraudulent conduct may be reached through" separate Code provisions,1°° without reference to any good faith obligation.
Second, the displacement proviso of section 1-103 proves troublesome. No specific Code provision expressly rejects punitive damages as
a remedy for bad faith conduct, but as a general matter of statutory
construction, a principle of law also may be displaced by statutory silence.101 Various remedial sections of the Code address impairment of
contract and breach of contract,1 0 2 and the novel remedial principles of
these sections demonstrate that the drafters did not hesitate to abrogate
common-law contract principles when desirable.10 3 Nowhere, however, does the Code abrogate the common-law reticence to introduce
punitive damages into the law of contract. Given the detailed scheme
of commercial remedies that arguably is preemptive, one may conclude
that additional judicial gloss on the statutory scheme is displaced.
These arguments that remedies for bad faith conduct do not fit
well into the Code's structure may be dismissed as technical nitpicking.
If bad faith conduct were otherwise a proper subject for a remedy, it
would be odd to deny that remedy because of its incongruity with statutory language; at most, clarification of the language, rather than dismissal of the remedy, would be necessary. The absence of an express
authorization for a remedy, however, reflects a subtle rejection of an
98. See U.C.C. § 1-103.

99. See Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957); Oestreicher v. Stores, 290
N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976); Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946).
100. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-721.
101. Thus, courts adopt the adage expresslo unius est excluslo alerus as a tool of statutory
construction. See J. SUTHERLAND, 2 STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 917, 1055 (1904).
102. See U.C.C. §§ 2-706 to -709, 2-712 to -716.

103. Most notably, the Code created specific rights to cover a breached contract, to cancel a
contract when there has been an anticipatory repudiation, and to obtain specific performance

more readily than permitted under common or prior statutory law.
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expansive interpretation of good faith as inconsistent with causal relationships in commercial law.
Damages in commercial situations compensate for economic harm
caused by one of the contracting parties. The injury suffered by the
aggrieved party, however, is his inability to obtain a stipulated opportunity for gain.l°4 In the traditional breach of contract situation, that
inability results from one of two events: either affirmative conduct or
omission by the alleged breacher that deprives the injured party of receipt of goods, money, and services to which he was entitled by the
terms of the bargain, or materialization of a risk that was allocated to
the breacher.105 Only in the third paradigm above, the case of the bluff
of nonperformance, did either of these events occur. There, the bad
faith actor affirmatively threatened nonperformance, causing harm to
the buyer. In the other cases, however, it is difficult to understand how
the alleged bad faith conduct could cause any injury.
In the first paradigm the seller's failure to obtain the expected benefit from his contract is triggered by his own failure to comply with
assumed obligations for reasons beyond the control of the buyer. Indeed, that initial, trivial breach emerges from materialization of a risk
which the seller assumed, presumably because he believed he was in a
superior position to control the occurrence of the risk. In this context, it
is difficult to contend that the buyer's failure to minimize the effects of
the risk once it materialized is the "cause" of the seller's failure to realize his anticipated opportunity for gain. If "cause" of such failure is
defined with sufficient breadth to encompass the omission to aid another contracting party who faces injury from materialization of a risk
he assumed, the responsibilities of contracting parties become awesome
in scope. Commercial responsibility would entail not only compliance
with one's affirmative obligations, but also forbearance from self-interested action that conflicts with the interests of other parties. Failure to
help others realize their opportunities for gain translates into responsibility for their subsequent loss. The commercial actor becomes responsible not simply for keeping his promises, but also for ensuring that the
optimal state of commercial affairs exists after the concerns of all parties to the transaction have been considered. If in our third paradigm,
104. D. DOBBS, REMEDIEs 786-87 (1973); H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
278 (1959).

105. See H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 104, at 287-91, for an analysis of how risk allocation may replace a strict causal inquiry in determining on which party a loss should fall. The role
of risk allocation in restricting excuses from contractual obligations is explored in Berman, Excuse
for Nonperformance in the Light of ContractPracticesin InternationalTrade, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1413, 1415-20 (1963). For a general critique of causal explanations of bad samaritanism, see
Mack, Bad Samaritanisr and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. ArF. 230 (1980).
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for instance, the seller's request for modification were made from an
honest conviction that he would otherwise suffer, the buyer who refused to grant the request would have "caused" that injury to the
seller.10 6 This notion of negative responsibility similarly means that in
our second paradigm the secured creditor's failure to notify caused the
devaluation of the debtor's assets. This result would obtain notwithstanding that, by hypothesis, the debtor had equal access to the information and that the secured creditor-had no original duty to notify the
07
debtor of the redemption.
Whether or not liability obtains for causation of these consequences requires further analysis. For present purposes, it is important
to note that the concept of causation that underlies an expansive notion
of commercial good faith is vastly different from traditional concepts of
causation and requires extended notions of responsibility.
The difficulty in finding authorization for a remedy in the commercial good samaritan situation, then, is not the existence of gaps in
doctrinal language, but that imposition of a remedy in these circumstances alters the concept of responsibility recognized in contract and
commercial law. It is difficult to believe that the drafters intended the
concept of "commercial decency" to accomplish such a result without
more elaborate explanation.
B. Administrative Difficulties in Remedying BadFaith.
The difficulty of identifying commercial good samaritanism in a
specific factual setting supports rejection of the extended responsibility
inherent in such conduct. Regardless of whether the term "honesty in
fact" excludes only acts of trickery and deceit or also broader categories
of taking advantage or profiteering from misfortune of others, courts
and commentators seem to agree that the test is to be applied subjectively.108 Proof that other commercial actors would have performed
differently does not suffice to demonstrate the absence of good faith.
106. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979), where the court rejected such a use of the good faith obligation. Even

if this causal relationship were admitted, it might be contended that "infliction" of the injury was
justified if granting the modification was unduly expensive to the buyer. The contention in this
article, however, is that such an inquiry should not be reached because the buyer has not caused
the seller's injury.

107. For a broad-based attack on the notion of negative responsibility for its restrictions on
individual liberty, see Williams, A Critiqueof Utilitarianism,in UTIL1TARIANIsM: FoR & AGAINST

93-96, 108-18 (J. Smart & B. Williams eds. 1973). For the argument in the context of tort law, see
Epstein, A4 Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).

108. See, eg., Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Balon
v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 113 N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194 (1973); Dugan, supra note 2, at 11-12; Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 671.
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The obligor is not expected to comport with conduct that he is incapable of performing. The obligation requires only that he perform to the
best of his ability.
The subjective, aspirational nature of the obligation creates two
related difficulties in addressing its violation. First, once the content of
good faith extends beyond the narrow scope of honesty, a vagueness in
definition exists that impedes agreement on the components of good
faith conduct and thus interferes with the directive to act in good faith.
Second, subjective differences in the ability to comply with a command
to act in good faith create difficulty in identifying whether the obligation has been satisfied and thus may promote misapplication of remedial sanctions.
1. The Problem of Vagueness. The command "go and act in good
faith" is vague because the actor and the commander may disagree on
the components of good faith conduct. Stripped of its limitation to
honesty and imbued with its utility as an "excluder,"'10 9 good faith may
mean different things to different obligors as well. An obligor who intends to comply with his legal responsibilities may conduct his affairs in
a manner consistent with his concept of good faith, only to discover
that his values differ materially from those of the obligee or of a third
party who sits in judgment of whether the command has been obeyed.
The possibility of disparate concepts of good faith may increase
when the obligation extends to failure to prevent harm in addition to
creation of circumstances that, in the everyday sense of the term, bring
about harm. Where the obligor creates the situation that requires rescue of the obligee, the causal relationship is sufficiently obvious to allow agreement on the components of good faith conduct. Where,
however, good faith conduct assertedly consists of preventing harm due
to circumstances not created by the obligor, the absence of a direct
causal relationship increases the likelihood of disagreement over
whether the obligor must act and what he must do to fulfill the expanded obligation.
The possibility of variations in the requirements of good faith even
in a single situation pervades cases such as Mott Equity Elevator v.
Svihovec,110 where the court was confronted with the question of
whether a purchaser of wheat was entitled to delivery of the goods.
The plaintiff-purchaser argued that the contract phrase "March Delivery" mandated delivery in March or at such later time as the plaintiff
109. Summers, supra note 2, at 196.
110. 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1975).
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requested delivery. The defendant-seller argued that "March" meant
during the month of March and that he was thus entitled to sell his
wheat at a higher market price when plaintiff refused to accept the
wheat during that month. Plaintiff pleaded that a shortage of boxcars
precluded acceptance of delivery earlier than September, when market
prices fortuitously had doubled from the contract price. In its discussion of the parties' obligations, the court noted that even if there had
been a boxcar shortage, the plaintiff could have accepted the wheat and
built or rented additional storage space to transfer the risk to itself.I I
The court refused, however, to impose on the farmer the affirmative
obligation to notify the plaintiff of the impending resale of the wheat.
Finally, the court considered that the farmer had not acted in bad faith
when he resold his wheat shortly after plaintiff refused to accept delivery and also that he was not delaying resale to take advantage of a
2
rising market."
The case demonstrates conflicting notions of the components of
good faith and the nebulous nature of the concept. The court's imposition of an obligation on the buyer to accept the wheat amounts to an
interpretation of the Code command "act in good faith" that embodies
affirmative duties of incurring costs of additional storage space if railway car shortages make acceptance of scheduled deliveries difficult.
Nevertheless, the defendant farmer, who might have avoided further
altercations had he informed plaintiff of his intention to deliver or resell the wheat, was not obligated by any notion of good faith to undertake that relatively effortless task since the law did not explicitly
mandate such notice." 3 The court intimates that had the farmer been
motivated by the ability to profit from resale of his goods in a rising
market, its decision might have been different. The defendant might
have been held to have violated a good faith obligation, le., he could
not have taken advantage of the fortuitous market shift.1 14 Recitation
of the different criteria by which good faith conduct may be measured
suggests that the concept may be too vague to expect courts to remedy
its violation with evenhandedness or consistency.
Vagueness in the concept of good faith would be of little importance if it were a temporary problem. It might be argued that definitional vagaries exist only because courts have not yet confronted a
sufficient number of cases to clarify the types of conduct prohibited by
section 1-203. Over time, the argument continues, courts will face suffi111.
112.
113.
114.

Id at 906 n.2.
Id at 909.
Id
Id
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cient similar litigation to create definite rules to govern the seemingly
nebulous law. Eventually, the courts will develop a general standard
against which specific conduct can be measured to ascertain whether
that conduct should be prohibited. Applying this general standard will
result in the expedient determination of compliance with the good faith
obligation.115
The flaw in this argument is that the vagueness problem is not
suited to temporal solutions. Philosophers and linguists have criticized
the belief that specific content can be derived from moral or normative
1 6 It
phrases by analysis of the context in which those phrases are used.
is possible that "good faith" is not susceptible to the type of perspicuous paraphrase that allows us to comprehend from ordinary usage of
the term precisely what the speaker means. Indeed, it is probable that
different judges will mean different things when using the phrase,
thereby undermining any attempt to derive a single meaning or single
principle from the combined usages. Moreover, even if all judges concur in a principle that embodies "good faith," they may fail to make
important distinctions in conduct." 7 Failure to aid a party to the contract may be justified as too costly in a given situation but not recognized as such under a principle of commercial good samaritanism.
Professor Summers probably would see no need to develop even a
general meaning for "good faith" as that phrase is used in section 1115. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegalRulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
266 (1974).
116. See R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 5-10 (1980); Hare, Rawls'
Theory ofJustice, in READING RAWLs 81, 86 (N. Daniels ed. n.d.).
117. We may also have a concern that judges have neither the training nor the temperament to
engage in the reflective process that arguably allows for extraction and justification of normative
principles from vague phrases. See Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibriumand heory.Acceptancein
Ethics, 76 J. PHiLosOpHY 256 (1979). Distrust of the judiciary is a common rationale for preferring formal rules over mote flexible standards or principles for legal decisionmaking. See R.
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECIsION 75-79 (1961); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1688. Topical
justification for distrust of judicial attempts to clarify vague normative standards is evident in
judicial applications of the "traditional govern.mental activity" standard of a state or local government. This standard defines those local functions that are free from federal regulation under the
tenth amendment. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The decisions
applying the standard display a disarming degree of idiosyncratic jurisprudence. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), af'din
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2352 (1981); Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y.
March 5, 1979) (commuter rail service does not constitute traditional governmental activity sufficient to preclude application of the federal Railway Labor Act) with United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980) (state-run commuter rail service does constitute
traditional governmental activity sufficient to preclude application of the federal Railway Labor
Act), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981).
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203. He argues that "good faith" is a phrase without general meaning,
but serves solely to exclude "a wide range of heterogeneous forms of
bad faith."118 His use of the phrase appears to be situation specific,
intended only to rule out precise forms of bad faith conduct in given
circumstances. If the good faith provision is, however, to be institutionally useful without creating opportunities for underinclusive and overinclusive applications, it cannot be defined as the absence of bad faith.
Opinions probably would differ about the existence of bad faith conduct in a specific situation, and to the extent that disagreement persists,
the same institutional difficulties in creating and enforcing a remedy
affect the determination of bad faith conduct.
In a non-Code setting, it is possible to envision case-by-case enforcement of a vague good faith obligation. The broad discretion implied by Summers's analysis currently is exercised by the German
courts in application of article 242 of the German Civil Code. This
provision is at least as broad as its Uniform Commercial Code counterpart: "Obligations shall be performed in the manner required by good
faith, with regard to commercial usage." 119 Notwithstanding the
vagueness of the German obligation, unqualified even by a limitation
to honesty in fact, one distinguished commentator noted that German
judges have utilized article 242 as a "roving searchlight" to identify
"injustice" in particular cases "within the limits of their own function
and when they had or could devise workable means to redress it."' 120
The German experience suggests the possibility that an imprecise
standard of good faith can have independent status and still be enforced with sufficient consistency to avoid the administrative difficulties
addressed above. Indeed, Professor Dawson concludes that "the requirements of 'good faith' have transformed the law of contracts and
have penetrated deeply throughout the whole of German private
law."' 21 The German experience with article 242, however, may not be
readily transportable to section 1-203 of the Code. As Dawson points
out, German judges may enjoy more acceptance than their American
brethren in the role of guardian of the community's morals. 122 That so
few cases have arisen in which the good faith provision appears to
make a substantive difference suggests the American judiciary's uneasiness in assuming a similar function. Moreover, some of the German
118. Summers, supra note 2, at 201.
119. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF LAW 461-502 (1968); Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion The German Version, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1041, 1044 (1976).

120. Dawson, supra note 119, at 1069.
121. Id 1045.
122. Id 1124. The reluctance of common law judges to assume such a role is explored in
Atiyah, Judges andPolicy, 15 IsRAEL L. Rnv. 346 (1980).
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cases suggest that article 242 is used in circumstances that American
law addresses under more specific provisions.1 23 For instance, numerous cases concerning rights to payment have arisen as a result of postwar currency alterations. These same cases probably would be decided
in this country under the impracticability provisions of the Code124
rather than under the more ambiguous notion of good faith. If article
242 permits German judges to do what American judges already are
directed to do by statutory and common law, it is of minimal value as a
comparative model. Indeed, article 242 may support the conclusion
that cases in which a sense of equity or the need to compel altruism
demands nonenforcement can be handled by existing doctrines and
thus there is less of a need for an expansive interpretation of section 1203.
2. The Possibility ofMisapplication. Even if courts can overcome
the definitional vagaries and agree on the components of good faith
conduct-or the kinds of bad faith conduct that are to be excluded
under section 1-203--they must demonstrate that the obligor has not
complied with the good faith obligation, a difficulty that has been
termed "nonverifiability" in another context.1 25 Failure to identify accurately the presence or absence of bad faith conduct will result in
overenforcement of sanctions for violation of section 1-203, thereby
punishing conduct that does not contravene standards of proper behavthereby jeopardizing equitable treatment of
ior, or underenforcement,
1 26
commercial actors.
Advocates of the gap-filler function of the good faith obligation
may cite examples of egregious behavior that all reasonable persons
would identify as bad faith conduct but that fall short of constituting a
breach subject to a specific Article 2 remedy. An independent remedy
under section 1-203 at least permits a court to reach those cases and fill
the gap. In such situations, however, the egregious nature of the obligor's conduct suggests the kind of deceit or lying that can be addressed
by a narrow interpretation of the obligation. For instance, Professor
Patterson explained the reach of the good faith obligation by reference
to Price v. Spielman Motor Sales Co. 127 In that case, the plaintiff had
123. See E. Cohn, Civil Law, in MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 59-62 (1st ed. 1950). Dawson

reports that the article has been employed with startling frequency--sufficient to fill a volume of
1388 pages. See Dawson, supra note 119, at 1045 n.5.

124. See U.C.C. § 2-615.
125. See Henderson & Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmentalPolicies: The Limits of
AspirationalCommands, 78 CoLium. L. REv. 1429, 1435 (1978).
126. See R. POSNER, EcONOMCc ANALYsIS OF LAW 424-25 (2d ed. 1977).
127. 261 A.D. 626, 26 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1941).
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agreed to purchase a truck from defendant and was allowed a trade-in
credit of $227.50. The contract prepared by the defendant permitted
him to revalue the trade-in truck at the time of delivery of the new
truck. When that time arose, five days after the contract was signed,
the defendant reappraised the used truck at $125 and refused to deliver
the new truck without an additional payment of $102.50. The court
implied from the contract a covenant not to reappraise the value of the
used truck without establishing some grounds "other than the lapse of
five days of time."128 Though the court used language of good faith in
reaching its decision, it clearly believed that the unexplained change in
price indicated intentional deceit of the buyer. Common law equitable
principles and remedies are sufficient to address that kind of fraud,
trickery, and over-reaching. A narrow interpretation of the good faith
same avenues of redress; the expansive
obligation encompasses these 129
interpretation is unnecessary.

Presumably, a novel remedy would be helpful in cases where conduct is not egregious and does not rise to the level of obvious deceit or
fraud but is nonetheless suspect. A case in point might have occurred
in Price had the defendant reappraised the car for $200. In that case
the court might have been less willing to cry "fraud" or "dishonesty,"
though it might have remained skeptical about the defendant's regard
for the bargain he had previously struck. It is precisely these cases in
which bad faith is less obvious, however, that present the problem of
nonverifiability. Short of confession by the defendant, it is difficult to
determine whether a revaluation to $200 was "dishonest" or commercially unreasonable.
A further example of suspicious, albeit nonegregious, behavior
may help to clarify the point. In Lee v. Wood ProductsCredit Union,130
a non-Code case, the plaintiff brought an action for conversion after
the defendant credit union repossessed his automobile. A jury awarded
plaintiff both general and punitive damages, 13' but the trial court
granted a judgment n.o.v. as to the punitive damages. On appeal, the
13 2
Supreme Court of Oregon reinstated the punitive damage award.
128. Id at 629, 26 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
129. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 2-302, 2-721; Underwood v. Monte Asti Buick Co., 73 Pa. D. &
2d 773,20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 657 (1976). In Umlas v. Acey Oldsmobile, Inc., 62 Misc. 2d 819, 310
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1970), the factual situation was similar to Price, except that on reappraisal the value
of the trade-in was determined by the dealer to have decreased from $400 to $50. There the court
implied an obligation to reappraise a used car in good faith from section
446 (Or.
Punitive damages were available since the action was brought in tort for conversion

rather than on a contract theory.
132. 551 P.2d at 449.
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The court concluded that although plaintiff had made several delinquent payments and was in default at the time of the repossession, the
credit union's previous waivers of delinquency precluded it from repossessing without advance notice of unwillingness to tolerate further late
payment. The court recognized that if the credit union had acted under
a mistaken but good faith belief that it was legally entitled to repossess
the automobile, no sufficient basis would-exist for an award of punitive
damages. But the court found that the record contained sufficient facts
from which a jury could have found bad faith conduct. 33
The evidence suggested that defendant's branch manager bore ill
will toward the plaintiff. The manager had refused partial payments
and had insisted on accelerated payment of the full balance. Employees of the credit union had attempted to block the plaintiff from moving his car from defendant's property after a "heated argument" with
the manager, who subsequently reported the car as stolen. The court's
opinion suggests that such conduct indicates that the credit union's subsequent repossession was motivated by considerations inconsistent with
good faith. 34 Logically, however, no inconsistency may exist. The
manager may have had great personal animus against the plaintiff, but
his actions may have been motivated entirely by business considerations. Certainly the good faith provisions do not require a party to a
commercial transaction to like the person with whom he is dealing.
The court apparently was unable or unwilling to determine how the
manager would have acted but for the animus, e.g, by comparing defendant's course of conduct in this case with his conduct in other cases
of delinquent debtors. Thus, in close cases-where a novel remedy for
bad faith is theoretically most beneficial-the nonverifiable nature of
the defendant's bona fides may interfere with accurate or justified application of sanctions.
C. Protectingthe Bargain of the Parties.
The discussion thus far has centered on the difficulties that an expansive good faith obligation would create for judicial implementation:
how to find an appropriate remedy and how to identify the offensive
conduct. An expansive obligation, however, would produce analogous
difficulties for the parties to the transaction. Although the Code covers
virtually all areas of commercial transactions, with few exceptions parties may agree to alter its provisions. 35 The parties, therefore, may
133. Id
134. Id

135. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3).
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structure their relationship in their own best interests to attain the certainty and predictability requisite to commercial law in a market economy. 136 Absent fraud or overreaching prohibited by provisions other
than section 1-203, the parties by themselves should negotiate an agreement that approximates an equilibrium between risks assumed and
prices paid. When the parties fail to provide specifically for allocation
of a risk or responsibility, however, the Code supplies the allocation.
Parties may choose to rely on the Code allocations, thus reducing the
amount of necessary bargaining; or, they may concentrate on certain
aspects of their bargain, aware of the consequences of a failure to do so.
The parties, however, can only determine with accuracy whether to accept or alter the Code's allocations if the legal consequences of those
allocations are certain and predictable. As argued below, an expansive
good faith obligation undermines the predictive capacities of commercial actors without producing countervailing benefits.
An expansive interpretation of the good faith obligation invites the
judiciary to "do justice" in particular cases. 137 For example, Summers's advocacy of good faith as a means for excluding certain conduct
from acceptable commercial behavior appears to be predicated on the
ability of and desirability for judges to make ad hoc determinations of
38
whether permitting specific commercial conduct would be "just.'
The danger is that such ad hoc judgments can undermine specific rules
of law on which commercial actors depend in making contractual arrangements. The result may be an individualized jurisprudence in
which judicial discretion exists to alter risks previously allocated between the parties. This is not to argue that the Code should utterly
"control the courts and compel decision."1 39 An absolute, relentless degree of certainty might require courts to enforce unfair bargains and
opprobrious conduct. Nor must one share Professor Atiyah's concern
that the extension of judicial discretion to define legal rights comes at
the expense of "the individual's freedom to plan and order his own life
and [portends] a corresponding growth in the power and paternalism of
136. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 402. In light of a party's ability to negotiate terms, some
judges have exercised healthy cynicism for attempts to avoid contractual terms after materialization of assumed risks. "The contractors had a ready escape from their difficulty by insisting upon

a contract before they used the figures; and in commercial transactions it does not in the end
promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves."
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (Hand, J.).
137. Witness the German courts' facility to "identify injustice" under article 242. See text

accompanying notes 119-24 supra.
138. See Summers, supra note 2.
139. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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the state." 140 If the parties, however, cannot predict whether their bargained-for allocation will survive the "roving searchlight" of good
faith, negotiation may be skewed from the model the Code seeks to
create. The same vagueness in definition that may lead a judge to misapply a remedy for a violation of the good faith standard may also
induce a risk-averse commercial actor, fearful of being penalized for
violation, to avoid behavior that is not in fact bad 'faith. He may "inrevest in the avoidance of risky [and potentially bad faith] activities
14 1
sources greater than the expected cost of these activities."'
Superficially, it appears that good faith, however defined, is consistent with the objectives of a certain, predictable corpus of commercial
law. To the extent that good faith fosters promise-keeping, commercial
actors can rely more readily on each other's forthcoming performance.
In the absence of that increased assurance, commercial actors who fear
delay in compensation or ultimate undercompensation in the event of
breach may attempt to insure against such losses by raising costs to
others of entering into a contract. 142 The additional cost may take the
form of higher prices (intended to include an "insurance premium" to
cover losses suffered due to breaches of other contracts) or clauses intended to deter breaches. 43 Existence of an enforceable good faith
principle that discourages breach presumably reduces the uncertainty
of performance and the costs associated with that uncertainty.
An expansive definition of good faith, however, may also serve as
a source of uncertainty if it permits judicial modification of legal rules
relied on in the parties' contractual arrangements. The costs of entering into a transaction are reduced to the extent that the parties are certain of the consequences of contract terms and can predict who will
bear specific risks. Existence of a broad principle, judicially applied
and not capable of disclaimer by bargaining, introduces an element of
uncertainty that is likely to increase risks and raise costs at the contract
formation stage.
Our first paradigm--concerning the buyer who rejects a late
tender because of a market decline that renders the contract disadvan140. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the JudicialProcess
andthe Law, 65 IowA L. REv. 1249, 1272 (1980). Atiyah's attempt to reconcile the "authoritari-

anism" of principle with the uncertainty of ad hoc "pragmatie' decisions is of central interest.
141. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 115, at 262.

142. This is the position taken in Burton, supra note 41, at 392-93.
143. See Goetz & Scott, LiquidatedDamages,Penalties and the Just CompensationPrincple

Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLuM. L. Rlv. 554
(1977).
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tageous to him 144-illustrates this point. Initially one might assume
that interpretation of the good faith obligation to prevent rejection in
such a case advances the certainty of contractual relations because sellers' expectations will not be defeated by technical nonconformities in
their tender of performance. Code provisions other than the good faith
requirement, however, already establish rules that provide parties to
the contract with certainty of legal rights. If, in our example, the goods
had been tendered subsequent to the due date (and the delay had not
been induced by any conduct of the buyer), the buyer who wished to
take advantage of the depressed market might breathe an initial sigh of
relief over his good fortune. He might assume that he is entitled to
reject the goods on arrival and cancel the contract since the Code embodies common law requirements of perfect tender. 145 If the seller
feared his inability to deliver by a specific date, he could have bargained for a later date or for a clause giving him latitude in the delivery
time. Either solution would have maintained the certainty of the parties' positions. An expansive reading of good faith, however, may preclude the buyer from taking advantage of the market downturn-and
avoiding his bad bargain-unless he can demonstrate that acceptance
of the nonconforming tender would cause him some injury other than
the loss of his opportunity to avoid his bad bargain. It is difficult to fit
the buyer's rejection of tender into traditional notions of dishonesty.
He has not lied or in any way created the risk that causes the delayed
delivery, and he may even admit that but for the market drop he would
have waived the nonconformity. Nevertheless, the availability of an
expansive interpretation of good faith reduces his ability to rely on the
seller's breach to cancel the contract.
From the standpoint of the commercial actor and his legal advisor,
therefore, the most important consequence of expanding good faith enforcement to this paradigm relates to their ability to predict the actor's
legal rights and-thus the legal consequences of his conduct. It is unclear whether the attorney can advise his client that cancellation of the
contract with the defaulting seller is appropriate under an expansive
144. See Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977). See text accompanying
note 65 supra.
145. U.C.C. § 2-601. It is unclear whether the seller would have the opportunity to cure the
late tender under section 2-508. Subsection 1 of the cure provision cannot be used because it

applies only when the time for performance has not expired. The negative implication of that
provision is that subsection 2 of section 2-508 must apply to permit cure in cases where the time
for performance has expired. Nevertheless, subsection 2 requires that the seller has a further
reasonable time to substitute a "conforming" tender. It is difficult to envision how a subsequent
tender could ever be "conforming" when it is in substitution for a tender that was rejected on
account of its lateness. See U.C.C. § 2-106(2).
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good faith standard. He must determine whether the client will be affected adversely-beyond the loss of a better bargain-by the nonconformity. Regardless of the difficulty of such a determination, the need
to make the inquiry at all introduces into sales law the notion of material breach that is rejected explicitly by the host of provisions concern146
ing perfect tender and cure.
Perhaps this argument's reliance on certainty of legal consequences proves too much. If we value certainty as a means to ensure
planning and finality in the transaction, rigid adherence to inflexible
legal rules may be counterproductive. If market price, for instance,
should decrease between the time of contract and the time for performance, the buyer, certain of his ability to avoid the contract on an imperfect tender, may go out of his way (overinvest his resources) in an
attempt to discover a trivial breach. 147 In anticipation of such buyer
behavior, a seller might overinvest in the inspection of goods to ensure
compliance with perfect tender requirements. In either event, absolute
certainty of the legal rights of the parties promotes wasteful conduct.
An expansive good faith obligation would disable the buyer from rejecting in such circumstances and thus would remove the reason for
148
overinvestment.
If there were no other safety valve available to prevent the waste
inherent in the possibility of rejections for trivial defects, use of the
good faith obligation might therefore appear justifiable. The need to
invoke an expansive obligation in such circumstances, however, seems
doubtful. If there is a real concern over the quality of the merchandise,
the parties have incentives to bargain over price reductions or other
149
mutually acceptable remedies without resort to legal doctrines.
146. See R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 30507 (1977); J. Wa-m & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 303-05 (2d ed. 1980). Cf. Miniter, Buyer'sRight ofRejection: A QuarterCentury Under
the Uniform CommercialCode, andRecentInternationalDevelopments, 13 GA. L. Rnv. 805 (1979)

(examining the concept of substantial impairment as a test for determining breach).
147. See K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 302 (1930); Eno, PriceMovement

and UnstatedObjections to the Defective Performanceof Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L.J. 782 (1935).
148. See Summers, supra note 2, at 205-06.
149. See Schwartz, Cure and Revocationfor Quality Defects: The Utility ofBargains, 16 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. Rnv. 543, 547-51 (1975). In this article, Schwartz argues that the cure provision
of the Code permits sellers to force unwanted "repaired" goods on buyers who have bargained for
"new" goods which have greater value. He argues that cure therefore shifts the cost of nonconformity from sellers to buyers and may create the very economic waste that cure is supposed to
avoid. Schwartz's argument assumes that buyers of goods that require repair will believe that the
goods they receive after cure are something other than new goods. Schwartz's view of consumer
expectations is not necessarily correct. Intuitively, it seems that buyers of goods anticipate that
new goods often require adjustment, and therefore the adjustment process is inherent in the newness of the goods. Indeed, the existence of warranties that promise repair indicates to consumers
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Where disagreement remains, however, the Code provides a specific
remedy of cure that should accomplish the same objective of reducing
wasteful conduct while preserving certainty of legal position, without
creating expansive and vague obligations for the parties. The cure remedy permits a seller whose goods have been rejected to remedy the nonconformity and re-tender the goods within the time agreed on for
performance. 150 A buyer seeking to avoid his bad bargain would be
unlikely to invest time or resources in discovering a nonmaterial defect
if the known consequence of his rejection is to give the seller an addi51
tional opportunity to tender conforming goods.
There are, however, situations in which a reduction in certainty
may be necessary to achieve some other objective of commercial law.
Obvious cases include nonenforcement of contract terms imposed
through fraud or bad faith in its narrow sense-lying or cheating. In
such cases, one assumes that setting aside the contract terms will result
in a net gain for commercial practice-a position that will be referred
to as a superior or optimal state of affairs. It is necessary to inquire,
therefore, whether the commercial good samaritan obligation can be
justified as a means to promote achievement of a superior or optimal
state of affairs. 152
the possibility of a need for adjustment of the goods after purchase. Thus, materialization of the
possible need for adjustment does not alter the "new" status of the goods and does not impose any
unexpected costs on the buyers. If an idiosyncratic buyer really would feel a loss if the goods he
purchased required adjustment in order to perform properly, he could bargain for a "no repairs"
clause in the contract or for a waiver of the seller's right to cure.
There may be situations, of course, in which the adjustment is so drastic that even the nonidiosyncratric buyer would incur costs in accepting the adjusted good. In such cases, however, the
mere existence of such costs to the reasonable buyer suggests that the "cured" tender is not a
"conforming" tender as required by UCC section 2-508(l). See U.C.C. § 2-106(2). This interpretation permits reconciliation of Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967) and
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 NJ. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). In Wilson the court
indicated that minor adjustments, which all reasonable buyers might assume are required on new
complicated goods (here, a color television), did not impose costs on the plaintiff. The court apparently would not have, however, accepted major adjustments and might not have considered an
attempt to tender a television that had suffered such an adjustment to be conforming. 228 A.2d at
850. That reading is supported by Zabrisk'e, in which the court held that the buyer of a new car
with a defective transmission did not have to permit cure of the defect. Presumably, that adjustment was so significant that the good could no longer be considered a "new" car.
150. U.C.C. § 2-508.
151. The ability of the Code to balance the perfect tender rule's certainty against the possibility of its abuse through rules of cure and revocation of acceptance is explored in J. WHIrrE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 146, at 304-05.
152. This causation analysis, see notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text, is concerned only
with the relationship between the obligor's good faith conduct and the creation of the obligee's
plight. If the obligor does not put the obligee in a position where assistance is necessary, the
causation analysis indicates that it is not bad faith for the obligor to refuse to give assistance. The
"state of affairs" analysis is concerned only with the consequences of the obligor's conduct. If the
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One might contend that no reason exists to protect the certainty
that permits buyers to take advantage of fortuitous technical breaches.
The buyer in the first paradigm arguably has assumed the contractual
risk of a market decline and should not be permitted to avoid the bargained-for risk allocation because of a technical breach. The breach
causes him no harm that he would not have suffered had the performance been conforming. It is unclear, however, whether any gain in
commercial practice is realized by prohibiting the buyer from capitalizing on the seller's breach. To the extent that the parties previously had
allocated risks between themselves, the seller had assumed the risk of
failure to make a conforming delivery. Materialization of that risk
should not be avoided any more readily than materialization of the risk
of market decline. That the buyer receives a windfall from the fortuitous breach does not necessarily mean that he is not entitled to it.
There are numerous situations of acquisition through chance or good
15 3
fortune in which the law will not intervene to alter the status quo.
As an illustration, consider Powel's reference to the following example of the accepted application of the French Civil Code provision
that contracts be performed in good faith:
An importer sells a quantity of goods. A clause in the contract
provides for 10 percent variation from the quantity because the importer wants to avoid liability for possible loss during importation or
carriage. But he cannot use the clause to increase or cut down by 10

percent the quantity he will deliver, according to whether there has
been a rise or fall in the
current price of the goods. That would be
to good faith. 154

contrary
Assuming that the limited reason for the variation clause in the contract was not specified during negotiations nor by any usage of trade, it
is unclear why the importer's taking advantage of a fortuitous market
shift over which he exercised no control constitutes bad faith. Either
the importer or his buyer will receive a windfall from the changing
market. There is no way that both will obtain only the benefits assumed in the original contract. If the buyer had been concerned about
such shifts, he presumably could have bargained expressly to limit use
of the ten percent variation provision to actual losses suffered in transit.
Even if one argues that the importer was in the best position to avoid
obligor can produce through his actions a superior state of affairs, this analysis indicates that good
faith requires those actions be taken.
153. See Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1225 (1979).

154. Powell, supra note 2, at 30.
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the consequences of the changing market, l55 he hardly has earned the
stigma associated with bad faith. Good faith should not be pressed into
156
service to remake the parties' bargain.
The point becomes clearer by positing that a commercial good samaritan who "rescues" the seller in our first paradigm has a right to be
compensated by the "rescuee" for loss suffered as a result of the rescue
attempt. 157 In the traditional rescue cases in tort law, acceptance of a
restitutionary right does not affect our decision to encourage the rescue
attempt. 158 A requirement that a drowning person compensate his rescuer whose clothes are ruined in the rescue would presumably not lead
the victim to resist rescue, as he still gains more than he loses after he
has been saved and has provided restitution to the rescuer. In our first
paradigm, 159 however, a restitutionary right indicates the futility of a
rescue requirement. For example, if the buyer accepts the late delivery,
thereby forgoing an opportunity to save himself $1000 and preventing
the seller's potential $1000 loss if the seller had been forced to resell the
goods at the declined market price, the restitution argument suggests
155. See generaly Posner & Rosenfield, Imossibility andRelatedDoctrines in ContractLaw:
An EconomicAnaolsis, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 83 (1977); Speidel, Excusable Nonperormancein Sales
Contracts- Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 54 S. C. L. REv. 241 (1980).
156. Powell suggests other ways in which an expansive obligation of good faith may reduce
certainty, such as by barring causes of action that are delayed but within the statute of limitations
or by barring a statute of limitations defense although the time prescribed by the statute has run
without the filing of the action. Powell, supra note 2, at 32. Powell also reports various abuses
made of expansive good faith obligations under German law: "Under the Nazis ... [it became
contrary to good faith.., to adhere to contracts made with Jews or other anti-Nazis." Id 35,
There is no suggestion in this article that good faith provisions should be judged by such aberrational abuse.
Similar concerns for certainty of the legal positions of the parties led to rejection of an obligation of commercial good samaritanism in Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583
S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied,444 U.S. 865 (1979). In that case the appellant, a supplier
of coal, contended that the respondent purchaser of coal acted in bad faith in refusing to modify
its contract to reflect increased market prices for coal. The court concluded:
Peabody's charge is based entirely upon the refusal of Public Service to accede to
Peabody's demands for price modification, which refusal, it asserts, constituted bad faith
and thus placed the onus of breach upon Public Service. Neither the law of contracts
generally nor the terms of U.C.C. relied upon by Peabody lend support to this theory.
The contract here involved was settled as a result of arm's length dealing with no cloud
of dishonesty, lack of good faith or failure to adhere to standard business or commercial
practice upon the part of either party.... Where an enforceable, untainted contract
exists, refusing modification of price and seeking specific performance of valid covenants
does not constitute bad faith or breach of contract, and the trial court properly so held.
Id at 725.
157. Thanks are due to James Henderson for suggesting this argument.
158. Few cases recognize rights of restitution for rescuers. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978); Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v.
Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). Generally, volunteers are not entitled to
claim restitution for their expenses. See II G. PALMER, LAW OF REsTnUnON § 10 (1978).
159. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
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that the buyer can recover his $1000 from the seller. This result is absurd. The conduct of the buyer has not made any party better off; his
conduct has merely transferred wealth that existed without his conduct.
Nor does commercial practice or society appear to receive any gain.
One may, however, attempt to draw a negative inference from this
argument and assert that when a commercial actor's conduct would
leave another better off without making anyone, including himself,
worse off, good faith requires altruistic conduct. The second paradigm 60 may be viewed as such an instance. Where the secured creditor is in possession of information not known to the debtor, revelation
of that information would not simply allocate a loss, it would avoid the
loss altogether. The creditor would retain his fully secured position
while the debtor would be in the superior position of receiving full
value for his collateral. In light of this argument, it is necessary to inquire whether an expansive good faith obligation can be justified as a
means of bringing about a superior state of affairs in these limited circumstances.
Theoretically, the good faith obligation should not be necessary in
such a situation to move the parties to act in a manner that will facilitate the rescue. Assuming that the parties are in a position to bargain
with one another over responsibility for conversion of the debentures,
the debtor should be willing to enter into any bargain necessary to
avoid the loss of the convertible feature's value so long as the cost to
him is less than the loss that otherwise would be suffered. The creditor
similarly should be willing to make the notification without any legal
obligation, so long as he can recover costs incurred in the process. Nevertheless, creditors may fail to act for one of two reasons, neither of
which would be eliminated by imposition of a good faith obligation.
First, even if the actor-creditor is willing to conduct himself in a manner consistent with reaching an optimal state of affairs, that position
may be indeterminate. Second, even if an objective actor can identify
the optimal state of affairs, the actor-creditor may be willing to forgo
attainment of that position, despite the unnecessary cost his choice imposes on him.
1. Comparing States ofAffairs-lndeterminacy. Indeterminacy of
the optimal state of affairs exists if the creditor is uncertain whether he
can recover his costs of notifying the debtor and thus cannot determine
whether his post-notification status is favorable or equal to his pre-notification status. The parties' agreement may be silent on the question of
160. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
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restitution. Of course, once the creditor has obtained the information,
the costs of notification should be minute, especially when compared to
the potential loss to the debtor. Nevertheless, the creditor's reluctance
to act in what appears to be the most rational1 61 manner may indicate
that he values his freedom to refrain from such action more than the
original calculus suggests. Imposition, through the good faith obligation, of a duty to notify may actually threaten the creditor's unspecified
but more highly valued considerations. Such impositions may become
disincentives to creditors to accept certain kinds of collateral that entail
unwanted duties and thus impede commercial transactions that concern such collateral. This result would be particularly undesirable if
most creditors would have informed the debtor even in the absence of a
requirement, notwithstanding costs to themselves. A creditor could act
in this way out of altruism or a desire to obtain a competitive advantage over other creditors. That advantage, however, is lost once the
notification becomes a requirement, and the creditor may eschew conduct that thus imposes only additional costs on him. 162 Alternatively, a
creditor may be willing to notify if the costs are small, but may avoid
accepting the collateral altogether if notification is required. He may
fear those few cases in which costs of notification become substantial,
1 63
although still smaller than the benefits to the debtor of notification.
The resulting restraints on alienation of certain kinds of property could
outweigh any gains of a good faith obligation and thus produce a less
than optimal state of affairs.
The indeterminacy issue may be even more apparent in response
to the different, but related, argument that imposition of a good faith
obligation actually deters the creation of a superior state of affairs. In
the following example, Professor Posner suggests that the modern theory of contract damages-which views a contract as an undertaking to
161. Rawls's definition of "rational" behavior is followed here:
[A] rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options

open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he
follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the

greater chance of being successfully executed. The special assumption I make is that a
rational individual does not suffer from envy. He is not ready to accept a loss for himself
if only others have less as well He is not downcast by the knowledge or perception that
others have a larger index of primary social goods. Or at least this is true as long as the
differences between himself and others do not exceed certain limits, and he does not
believe that the existing inequalities are founded on injustice or are the result of letting

chance work itself out for no compensating social purpose:
J. RA,
.supra note 82, at 143.
162. See R. POSNan, .s7pranote 126, at 132-33; Landes & Posner, Savors, Finders, Good SVamwitan, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83

(1978).
163. See R. POSNER,

note 126, at 132.

Hupra
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perform or pay damages for nonperformance' 64-properly avoids penalizing a breach that corrects a bargained-for misallocation of resources:
I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at $ .10
apiece to A, for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered
10,000, B comes to me, explains that he desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he will be forced to close
his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me $ .15 apiece for 25,000
widgets. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely
delivery to A, who sustains $1000 in lost profits from my breach.
Having obtained an additional profit of $1250 on the sale to B, I am
better off even after reimbursing A for his loss. Society is also better
off. Since B was willing to pay me $ .15 per widget, it must mean that
each widget was worth at least $ .15 to him. But it was worth only
$ .14 to A---the $ .10 that he paid plus his expected profit of $ .04
($1,000 divided by 25,000). Thus the breach resulted in a transfer of
the 25,000 widgets from a less to a more valuable use. To be sure,
had I refused to sell to B, he could have gone to A and negotiated an
assignment of part of A's contract with me to him. But this would
have introduced
an additional step and so imposed additional trans165
action costs.

If we value allocative efficiency as an optimal state of affairs in
contract remedies, Posner's hypothetical suggests we should not add
damages that will deter the breach notwithstanding arguable bad faith
conduct.

66

Thus, we should not impose any additional remedy for

164. A classic statement of the theory that a contract is not a sacrosanct document to be
honored in all its terms is found in Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 462
(1897):
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the
law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary rights and duties
are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The
duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must
damages if
you do not keep it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum. f you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum
unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference.
It might appear unclear why there is a conflict between efficiency in commercial law and an expansive notion of good faith that encourages commercial good samaritanism. Rather, one might
argue that the two notions are consistent. One of the traditional arguments against the common
law's refusal to recognize good samaritan duties in tort law is that if A can, at relatively small cost,
avoid great harm to B, society at large will benefit. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 L
LEGAL STUD. 151, 189-91 (1973). Similarly, one might argue that if a commercial actor can assist
another at relatively low cost to himself, it would be efficient to require him to do so. In this
instance an expansive interpretation of good faith would be consistent with the efficiency objective.
Liability for failure to rescue, however, may not be more efficient than nonliability. The costs
of a liability rule may render it inefficient in its administration. See Landes & Posner, supra note
162, at 126.
165. R. PosNER, supra note 126, at 90.
166. The same issue is presented, perhaps rhetorically, in E. FARNSWORTH & W. YoUNG,
CASES AND MATERIAlS ON CONTRACTS 20 (1980).
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breach of the good faith obligation, at least if that remedy provides a
disincentive to the efficient breach. 167 Arguably, however, any such
remedy is irrelevant to the promisor's conduct. In the absence of some
remedy for bad faith, the promisor may attempt to keep A from discovering the intention to breach out of a concern that A may otherwise
attempt to obtain a decree of specific performance. 168 If A does not
discover the intention to breach, A will be limited to the lost profits
recovery suggested by Posner, and the promisor will prosper. If, however, the promisor's liability might be increased by an independent recovery for bad faith, the promisor will be uncertain whether he will be
better off breaching and paying all applicable damages or whether he
should refrain from breaching. If the promisor decides not to breach
and forgoes opportunities to bargain with A about the situation, 169 one
might conclude that imposition of the good faith obligation actually
has deterred attainment of a superior state of affairs.
Indeterminacy of relative states of affairs, however, suggests that
this conclusion is unwarranted. The conclusion proceeds from the assumption that the aggrieved party, A, has no reason to complain so
long as he recovers the profit he expected on the transaction. 70 If A
167. For examples of efficient breach situations, see Jackson, '"4nticpatory Repudiation" and
the Temporal Element of Contract Law: An Economic Inquiry Into Contract Damages in Cases of
Prospective Nonperformance, 31 STAN. L. REv. 69, 86 n.59, 112 n.153 (1978).
168. See, eg., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Kaiser Trading
Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The propriety of
granting specific performance in this situation is explored in Kronman, Specfc Peiformance, 45
U. Cm. L. REv. 351 (1978), and Schwartz, The Casefor Spe~c eformance, 89 YAe L.J. 271
(1979).
169. There are other avenues open to the promisor, but they lead to the same result. For
instance, if the promisor is uncertain whether he will be better off after breaching the contract and
paying all damages, he may go to A and inform him of his intention to breach. If A protests that
he cannot obtain the goods elsewhere, which is presumably true or else B would not value the
goods so highly, the promisor may attempt to bargain out of the good faith penalty and propose to
A that they split the $ .01 per unit that the promisor expects to make on the new contract. Assuming that the transaction costs of this additional bargain are low, the goods still will move into the
hands of B, who values them most highly, while also increasing the benefits to the promisor and to
A. Indeed, it might be argued that this is a superior result in that it makes both the promisor and
A better off, rather than only the former, and prevents the promisor from benefiting by his broken
promise to A without sharing the gain with A.
For reasons described in the text, however, it is unlikely that A would agree to split the extra
profit in this way. If he believes or is uncertain that he was "made whole for his loss" with the
original $ .04, he is unlikely to be certain that he is in a position superior to that obtained by the
promisors performance if the promisor shares the extra $ .01 with him. Thus, if the promisor
fears that A will attempt, on discovery of the intention to breach, to prevent the breach, e.g., by
obtaining a decree of specific performance, the promisor will not inform him of his intention to
breach, will not try to reach any bargain with him, and will proceed as indicated in the text.
170. R. POsNE, supra note 126, at 89-90.
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were not, in fact, "made whole for his loss"' 1 7' with the original $ .04
per widget recovery, the extent to which he is undercompensated may
exceed the gains realized on the second contract. The sources of A's
undercompensation are by now well rehearsed: 72 inability to recover
negotiation or litigation expenses incurred to obtain traditional compensation, limitations on compensable damages to certain kinds of economic injuries, and limitations on measurement of those injuries to
provable losses. 173 For instance, if A had hoped that buyers of his
goods that incorporated the widgets would continue to deal with him,
his failure to provide goods for them on this occasion may cost him
profits on future unrelated transactions as well. Even with respect to
those losses that are recoverable, idiosyncratic values placed on the
contract by A may render performance more valuable to him than is
indicated by objective compensation standards. 174 For instance, he
may place an idiosyncratic value on keeping promises to his customers.
Because we cannot know whether undercompensation of the buyer exceeds gains realized by the seller on the second contract, we cannot
conclude that the promisor's breach actually moves commercial practice to a superior state of affairs.
2. ComparingStates ofAffairs-Bad Guesses, BadMotives. Even
if we could identify one state of affairs as superior to another, it is not
clear that imposition of a good faith obligation would lead to realization of the superior state. Insofar as good faith conduct requires actions that will produce a superior state of affairs, the obligation is
consistent with other consequentialist theories that seek to maximize
the availability of certain goods.175 These theories present little internal difficulty 76 if we assume that an objective observer can identify, in
a given set of circumstances, the most desired consequences and the
courses of conduct an actor should follow to obtain those consequences. If it were agreed that we should maximize the number of widgets in society and it were also agreed that pushing button A would
produce 50 percent more widgets than pushing button B, an objective
observer would conclude that the actor should push button A. The actor's actual knowledge or subjective belief about what he should do is
171. Id 90.
172. See, eg., Farnsworth, LegalRemedlesfor Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1216 (1970); Goetz & Scott, supra note 143, at 558 n.19.

173. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 143, at 558 n.19 and citations therein.
174. See Williams, supra note 107, 79, 82-85.
175. See id 82-93.
176. That is to say, these theories are comprehensible and logical, although not necessarily

correct from a normative standpoint.
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immaterial to the correctness of his conduct; if, however, he misperceives facts or lacks knowledge, his conduct is unlikely to achieve
the state of affairs that he seeks. 177 If the actor, in his well-intentioned
folly, believes that he can produce more widgets by pushing button B,
he will push that button and thereby fail to attain an optimal state of
affairs. Nevertheless, a consequentialist theory that defines "right action" in non-objective terms will approve his conduct. It is, therefore,
important to realize the subjective nature of the obligation of good
faith. 178 The actor who is informed that good faith requires him to act
in a manner that maximizes the welfare of all concerned may misperceive the positions of the various parties and, in particular, is likely
to overestimate the beneficial consequences to others of action that
benefits himself.
For instance, in Posner's example the prospective breacher stands
to gain from nonperformance of the first contract. Even if he is informed that he should avoid his contract and pay damages only if society benefits from such conduct, he cannot act objectively in deciding
whether to breach the contract. Inevitably influenced by the prospect
of his own gain, he may overvalue the beneficial consequences to others
of his breach, ignore the aggrieved party's undercompensation and
therefore fail to perform the contract even though his breach does not
achieve a superior state of affairs. Similarly, the buyer in our first paradigm may view his savings if he avoids his bad bargain as indicative of
society's savings as well and thus find a breach where none exists. In
neither case, however, can we say that the breacher has failed to act in
good faith. The subjective standard for good faith conduct prohibits
labeling as bad faith conduct that is only misguided or foolish if that
conduct is consistent with the actor's beliefs about his obligation or his
beliefs about the facts that determine his obligation. 179 Thus, good
faith conduct will not necessarily produce a superior state of affairs.
It might be possible to reconcile a subjective definition of good
faith with a desire to make good faith consistent with welfare-maximizing conduct if actors had incentives to scrutinize carefully the consequences of their conduct and thereby to increase the probability of
making guesses that actually reflect welfare-maximizing conduct. The
incentives might temper the tendency of commercial actors to make
177. Cf D. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND COOPERATION 12-13 (1980) (discusses the difference between "subjective probabilities" and "true probabilities" in the context of "act-utilitarian-

ism").
178. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
179. See, e.g., Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Leo's Used Car Excb., 362 Mass. 797, 291 N.E.2d 603

(1973).
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guesses about welfare-maximizing choices based on self-interest. The
risk of overvaluation of prospective personal loss has led to a rule in
tort law that requires one who damages property of another in order to
save his own property to compensate the other party for the damage
done.180 The rule is intended to provide an incentive to save from injury more highly valued goods. Thus, if the endangered party guesses
wrong about the relative value of his goods, he will be penalized to the
extent that the other property was more valuable. In contract law,
however, there is no disincentive to breach where society would be better off with performance because of the undercompensation inherent in
the damage system and the failure to take from the breacher the gains
of his breach. 18 ' If the deliberate breacher guesses correctly about the
relative value of the new contract he can make, he arguably benefits
both himself and society, as suggested by Posner in the above example.-182 Even if the new contract turns out not to create a superior state
of affairs, however, the breacher will not have to divest any gains from
his new contract after compensating the aggrieved party for the breach.
Thus, the potential deliberate breacher has nothing to lose by his
breach and has a possibility of gain. His actions are in good faith if he
engages in self-interested conduct consistent with his perceptions of
welfare-maximizing conduct.
Finally, if a model of rational behavior 8 3 indicates that a commercial actor would attempt, albeit unsuccessfully, to attain an optimal
state of affairs even without imposition of a good faith obligation, the
fact that the actor conducts himself otherwise simply may suggest that
he is not acting rationally. Failure to assist others may evolve not only
i8 4 Even
from mistake, as suggested above, but also from spite or envy.
with all the information and capability necessary to bring about the
optimal state of affairs, the ungenerous actor simply may desire not to
help someone else, especially if the actor's expost situation is the same
as his ex ante situation, ie., there is reimbursement for costs incurred
by the rescuer, but no reward or profit for his conduct. Indeed, the
actor even may be willing to accept certain costs to realize irrational, or
at least unkind, objectives. Even if such motivations are not considered
in calculating the highest-valued alternative for purposes of defining
180. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). The incentive value of the rule is explored in Gillette, supra note 70, at 388-92.
181. See Farnsworth, supra note 172.

182. See R. POSNER, supra note 126, at 90.
183. See note 161 supra.
184. See Leff, supra note 64.
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good faith conduct, 185 it is possible that imposition of some cost for
violation of the good faith obligation would not deter the envious or
spiteful person. To the extent that commercial actors conduct themselves irrationally, the good faith obligation will not produce a superior
state of affairs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be superficially inconsistent to commend the Code's good
faith provision as a means to imbue commercial transactions with a
moral overlay and to refuse to define those provisions broadly. Nothing in this article, however, is intended to disparage adherence by commercial actors to the broadest possible interpretation of good faith.
The concern in this article is that attempts to enforce such an interpretation through the legal system must confront costly obstacles precipitated by the limitations of that system. These limitations may be
irrelevant to the inherent worth of good faith. 86 To the extent they are
irrelevant, the question is whether there is some way to attain the value
of a broad good faith obligation while avoiding its limitations.
It may be that the mere presence of a good faith obligation goes
far in this direction. The precatory use of the good faith provision has
been demeaned,' 8 7 but this criticism is shortsighted. Even if good faith
receives a narrow judicial interpretation, it may induce desirable commercial conduct in marginal areas. Moreover, the statement of a good
faith obligation, even narrowly construed for purposes of liability, effectively may convey the impression that commercial benevolence constitutes a supererogatory act that commercial actors should pursue,
notwithstanding the legal system's neutrality on the issue. That, of
course, has been our attitude toward actors who have the opportunity
to prevent physical harm to others at minimal cost to themselves. Our
unwillingness to impose sanctions on the actor who fails to attempt rescue does not suggest we are indifferent to his conduct. Rather the legal
response recognizes difficulties inherent in the attempt to enforce a contrary rule. There may be distinctions between the nonrescuers of tort
law and commercial actors who fail to extricate others from misfortune
that suggest a need or willingness to extend liability to the latter. For
185. See Williams, supra note 107, 104-05 (presenting the argument that a strict utilitarian
should give no weight to "bad feelings" in calculating the proper course of action).
186. See J. RAwLs, supra note 82, at 176:
[W]hen we enter an agreement we must be able to honor it even should the worse possibilities prove to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith. Thus the
parties must weigh with care whether they will be able to stick by their commitment in

all circumstances.
187. See Dugan, supra note 2, at 47.
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instance, the commercial actor not only fails to rescue in numerous
cases, but also directly benefits from the other's misfortune and thus
needs some countervailing incentive to act benevolently. Furthermore,
contract and commercial law already deviate from noninterventionism
by virtue of doctrines such as mitigation and by damage formulae intended to prevent nonbreachers from reaping windfalls. The point of
the article is not the wrongheadedness of attempts to conform commercial conduct to ethical or economic objectives. Rather, the intent is to
raise questions about using notions of good faith for that purpose.
Since most of the difficulties that generate the questions lie in the administration and remedy of a good faith obligation, one might hope to
capture the benefits of an expansive obligation while avoiding the obstacles. If so, the best course is one that administers the less troublesome narrow conception of good faith with an ancillary exhortative or
precatory function that carries no legal sanctions. Beyond moral suasion, however, enforcement of an expansive notion of good faith appears to present overwhelming difficulties.

